To Regulate or not to Regulate? A Comparison of Government Responses to Peer-to-Peer Lending Among the United States, China, and Taiwan by Tsai, Chang-hsien
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 4 Article 5 
May 2019 
To Regulate or not to Regulate? A Comparison of Government 
Responses to Peer-to-Peer Lending Among the United States, 
China, and Taiwan 
Chang-hsien Tsai 
Institute of Law for Science & Technology, National Tsing Hua University (Taiwan), 
chstsai@mx.nthu.edu.tw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Chang-hsien Tsai, To Regulate or not to Regulate? A Comparison of Government Responses to Peer-to-
Peer Lending Among the United States, China, and Taiwan, 87 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1077 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
1077 
TO REGULATE OR NOT TO REGULATE?  
A COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO PEER-TO-
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ABSTRACT 
With the worldwide revolution in financial technology (“FinTech”), 
Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) lending, an alternative funding channel, has 
grown rapidly over the past decade. P2P lending benefits digital 
financial inclusion by providing an online platform to facilitate direct 
trades between borrowers and lenders with limited intermediation by 
traditional financial institutions. During P2P lending transactions, a 
significant amount of transaction records are accumulated, thus 
creating a FinTech-driven credit assessment mechanism to help 
underserved borrowers, who are often turned down by traditional 
financial intermediaries, obtain credit. P2P lending business models as 
well as government responses to those models differ. For example, the 
United States has been reactive, requiring platforms to fully comply with 
the extant securities regulation, while China, though initially hands-off, 
has also become reactive, limiting P2P platforms to the information 
intermediation model due to a series of P2P failures. Taiwan’s 
regulatory response to P2P lending, led by its Financial Supervisory 
Commission (“FSC”), the sole financial market watchdog in Taiwan, 
started as reactive, warning that the P2P lending industry should not 
cross four major red lines drawn under existing regulatory and business 
structures. The Taiwanese government, however, has become more 
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proactive—at least in form, introducing the Financial Technology 
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech 
Sandbox Act”) to permit cautious regulatory experimentation. Though a 
positive effort, this act may, in substance, be an ineffective means to 
address the regulatory dilemma between prudential regulation and 
financial competition and innovation. This is because the government 
lacks the institutional incentive to replace the existing regulatory regime 
with something truly proactive. We propose a structural change in the 
current institutional design that could reallocate the authority of 
financial competition and innovation to a more motivated financial 
agency, separate from and independent of the FSC, that would be better 
positioned to safeguard financial competition and innovation enabled by 
FinTech.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the growth of financial technology (“FinTech”), many internet 
technology companies, having accumulated a large number of users and 
transaction records via online platforms, have begun to provide financial 
services without significant intermediation by traditional financial 
institutions. Since the first Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) lending platform was 
launched in 2005, this type of FinTech transaction has turned into a 
global market with a variety of distinct business models and promising 
growth rates. 1  In general, P2P or marketplace lending is defined as 
“lending money to borrowers without going through a traditional 
financial intermediary such as a bank.”2 P2P platforms apply innovative 
credit scoring models which are “heavily data-driven, employ semi-
automated risk assessment methods[,] and leverage nontraditional data 
points.” 3  These models and techniques help borrowers who face 
challenges when trying to obtain credit through traditional channels 
acquire loans, thus enhancing digital financial inclusion.4 However, new 
risks may emerge from financial innovation. For example, derivatives 
and securitization could transfer and alter risk in a sophisticated way, 
which—due to their risk-shifting characteristics—could, in turn, 
 
 1. The Future of Fintech—A Paradigm Shift in Small Business Finance, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM 12 (Oct. 2015), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2015/FS/GAC15_The_Future_of_FinTech_Paradigm_Shift_Small_
Business_Finance_report_2015.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Tobias Berg, Valentin Burg, Ana Gombović, & Manju Puri, On the Rise of FinTechs – 
Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints 28 (NBER Working Paper No. w24551, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3163781 (“Particularly in developing countries, the inability of the 
unbanked population to participate in financial services is often caused by a lack of information 
infrastructure, such as credit bureau scores. Many countries have therefore already started leveraging 
digital technologies to promote financial inclusion.”). For digital financial inclusion, see also G20 High-
Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion, GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION i 
(2016), 
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/G20%20High%20Level%20Principles%20for%20Dig
ital%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20Full%20version-.pdf (noting that in this digital era, digital 
financial inclusion benefits efficient interconnection between participants in the market, and that the 
method of creating adaptive regulatory approaches and the method for accelerating the use of digital 
technologies will be crucial to improve financial access and achieve universal financial inclusion). 
4
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contribute to the global financial crisis.5 Similarly, in the case of P2P 
lending, “the general misalignment of interest has been raised as critical, 
as marketplaces issue loans but often don’t retain any risk.”6 When the 
credit issued is of lower quality, the risk of default will increase.7 We 
can thus observe some inherent systemic risks with unforeseeable 
consequences on P2P platforms.8  
In addition, a finding by Transparency Market Research even states 
that the opportunity in the global P2P market will be worth $897.85 
billion by 2024, an increase from $26.16 billion in 2015.9 In light of the 
increase in P2P lending over the past decade, many financial regulators 
across jurisdictions have attempted to “balance the traditional regulatory 
objectives of financial stability and consumer protection—the focus of 
post-Crisis regulatory changes—with the objectives of promoting 
growth and innovation” in the past several years. 10  Because the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”), which is the sole financial 
market watchdog in Taiwan charged with both consumer protection and 
prudential regulation, is inclined to adopt a conservative civil-law 
approach by setting forth detailed rules that market participants must 
follow, the development of FinTech-enabled financial services such as 
P2P lending would be restrained due to the regulatory gap.11  
 In reality, even though the Taiwanese government has, in form, 
become more proactive by enacting the Financial Technology 
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech 
Sandbox Act”), an official regulatory sandbox to permit cautious 
regulatory experimentation, the FSC, in substance, might actually be 
 
 5. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis, & Douglas W. Arner, Regulating a 
Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 36-
37 (2017).  
 6. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 16. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 17. 
 9. Peer-to-Peer Lending Market - Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth, Trends and 
Forecast 2016 – 2024, TRANSPARENCY MARKET RESEARCH (2016), 
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/peer-to-peer-lending-market.html (last visited July 4, 
2018). 
 10. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 34. 
 11. Fa Zhan Jin Rong Ke Ji, Jian Li Si Wei Yao Tiao Zheng [Regulatory Philosophy Need Be 
Adapted in Facilitating Financial Technology], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Oct. 
9, 2017) (Taiwan), http://opinion.chinatimes.com/20171009000028-262113 (noting the incumbent 
Chairman Gu of the FSC emphasized that the Taiwanese legal system is a civil law system and that 
unless authorized by statutes or regulations administrative agencies have difficulty in permitting the 
provision of financial products or services not yet authorized). For a discussion on the FSC charged with 
both consumer protection and prudential regulation, see Chang-hsien Tsai, Choosing Among Authorities 
for Consumer Financial Protection in Taiwan: A Legal Theory of Finance Perspective, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 219, 239-43 (Emilios Avgouleas & David Donald 
eds., 2019). 
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reactive in genuinely embracing FinTech. This is caused by the absence 
of institutional incentives to devote its resources to substituting the 
existing regime with a new style of regulation. This may be because the 
FSC may easily be subject to the regulatory capture, inertia, and risk-
averse decision-making. Within our proposed reform framework to 
regulate such FinTech-enabled services such as P2P lending in Taiwan, 
in the short term, the institutional philosophy of “more principles-based” 
financial regulation (“MPBR”) should be embedded in the FSC’s 
mindset when implementing the FinTech Sandbox Act.  
Nevertheless, we would like to direct further discussion about 
government responses to FinTech towards the regulatory design of a 
stronger and more independent competition authority for consumer 
financial products and services. Specifically, for the long run, we would 
propose a structural change in institutional design, i.e., reallocating the 
authority of financial competition and innovation to a motivated 
financial agency. With a professional agency that is separate from and 
independent of the FSC (the sole financial regulator in Taiwan with a 
predominant focus on prudential regulation), this newly created single 
financial agency would be better positioned to safeguard competition 
and innovation in the financial market enabled by FinTech. This more 
structural change in the extant financial system and their own style of 
regulation would also promote effective competition in the interests of 
consumers, while providing long-term regulatory certainty for FinTech-
driven financial market development. 
This paper examines the business models of P2P or marketplace 
lending and compares respective regulatory responses to alternative 
finance options such as P2P lending across the United States, China, and 
Taiwan. Next, by examining Taiwan’s change in regulatory responses, 
this paper emphasizes how institutional design and incentives are likely 
to play a significant role in developing the FinTech market with the 
benefits of digital financial inclusion. Part I and Part II introduce 
business models and regulatory frameworks of P2P lending in the 
United States and China. Part III discusses potential violations of extant 
financial laws and regulations in major business models of P2P lending 
in Taiwan. Part IV advocates for creating an independent agency to act 
separately from the FSC and to exclusively control its own rulemaking, 
supervision, and enforcement of consumer financial competition 
measures in Taiwan. This proposal for a more proactive and structural 
approach to FinTech would help bring the issue of financial competition 
and innovation to the attention of the government, so that we can further 
prevent undue external influences from regualtory capture, institutional 
inertia, and risk-averse decision-making by financial regulators. 
Meanwhile, this body would be better suited to offer a truly independent 
6
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perspective on competition and innovation within the financial system, 
so as to refrain from driving FinTech firms away from Taiwan and 
prevent them from relocating overseas due to long-term regulatory 
uncertainty. 
I. P2P LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prosper, a P2P platform first launched in the U.S. in 2006, funded $20 
million in loans within 9 months; a year later, Lending Club was 
launched and became the largest U.S. P2P lending platform. Currently, 
Prosper and Lending Club enjoy 98% of the U.S. market share.12 The 
P2P lending industry's success can be attributed to timing. After the 
global financial crisis in 2008 (“GFC”), “the resulting increase in 
political scrutiny—alongside the fact that interest rates continue[d] to 
remain stubbornly low—created an opportunity for peer to peer lenders 
to project themselves as an accessible alternative for borrowers.”13  
With U.S. P2P lending, a majority of lenders are institutional 
investors (e.g., asset managers, pension funds, and hedge funds). 14 
Increasingly, retail and institutional investors are separated by platforms 
as institutional lenders are the only category of investors that can invest 
in more risky loans.15  Even though U.S. policy-makers offered little 
support for P2P lending, partnerships between banks and P2P lending 
firms have been building since the outset.16 For example, a deal between 
Citi and Lending Club was announced in April 2015; bank-P2P lender 
partnerships like this would supply extra funding to small and medium-
sized enterprises, which would provide legitimacy to P2P lending.17 
A. A Bird’s Eye View of Business Models 
Instead of being an information intermediary between lenders and 
borrowers or selling loans to investors wholesale, a number of U.S. P2P 
 
 12. Ed Bell, How Did P2P Lending Evolve? A Three Minute History, HARMONEY (Apr. 22, 
2014), https://www.harmoney.co.nz/blog/how-did-p2p-evolve-a-three-minute-history-lesson. 
 13. Reema Mannah, Holding Profit Margins: Reducing the Pressures Imposed by Peer to Peer 
Lending, TITLESOLV (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.titlesolv.com/hot-topics/holding-profit-margins-
reducing-the-pressures-imposed-by-peer-to-peer-lending-/. 
 14. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 13. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The Complex Regulatory Landscape for Fintech: An Uncertain Future for Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprise Lending, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 18 (2016), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Complex_Regulatory_Landscape_for_FinTech_290816.pdf. 
 17. Id. In contrast to the more market-driven partnership between P2P platforms and banks in the 
United States, Taiwanese financial regulators in 2016 highly encouraged banks and P2P platforms to 
collaborate with each other. This intervention was aimed to require the platforms to comply with 
existing law and regulations applied to banks. See infra Parts III.B.1 and IV.D. 
7
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lenders would issue notes backed by loans that are selected and funded 
by the investors on P2P platforms. 18  Formally, the platform lender 
retains those loans. In practice, “the credit risk is passed on to the 
investor because the notes entitle the investor to payment only when 
borrowers make payments on the loans.”19  For example, as a lender 
expresses interest in a potential borrower on the Lending Club platform, 
with WebBank (a Utah-chartered industrial bank) lending to the 
borrower, “Lending Club permanently retains ownership of the 
borrower indebtedness.”20 Thereafter, Lending Club’s debt instrument or 
notes are sold to the lender, “who becomes a creditor of the platform 
rather than a borrower.”21  The Lending Club platform is obliged by 
these notes to “pay an amount derived from borrower payments.” 22 
These transactions can be categorized under the asset securitization 
model and are likely subject to federal securities law as discussed 
below.23 
B. The Regulatory Framework 
1. The Securities Act of 1933  
While Prosper requested a no-action letter after its launch in February 
2006, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was not 
willing to give an assurance that no action would be brought against 
platform lenders for securities law violations.24 On November 24, 2008, 
the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order (the “Order”) to Prosper based 
upon the Supreme Court’s precedents in Howey25 and Reves,26 arguing 
that those notes issued by Prosper were securities as defined in Section 
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act.27 Since Prosper had not registered with the 
SEC prior to the Order, the SEC determined that Prosper should register 
 
 18. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 16, at 15.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 
445, 476-77 (2011).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 459-60, 465. See also Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online 
Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for 
an Evolving Industry, 9 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 517 (2012) (discussing that the securitized loans 
(i.e., the notes) that are sold in P2P lending transactions would be similar to the mortgage-backed 
securities that are securities under federal securities law).  
 24. Verstein, supra note 20, at 475. 
 25. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946). 
 26. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56-58 (1990). 
 27. Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings against Prosper Marketplace, Inc., 
Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order). 
8
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as a public company with the SEC and “should only sell notes through a 
prospectus with an effective registration statement.”28 Subsequent to the 
issuance of the Order, all of the U.S. P2P platform lenders either filed 
registration statements with the SEC or just folded up.29  
2. GAO Report 
Subsequent to the GFC, according to Section 989F(a)(1) of the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act (the “Dodd–Frank Act”), the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) was assigned to research 
and develop an “optimal Federal regulatory structure” for the P2P 
lending industry.30 In July 2011, the GAO published a report to identify 
two primary options for regulating P2P lending: “(1) continuing with the 
current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting lenders through 
securities regulators and borrowers primarily through financial services 
regulators, which will include the newly formed CFPB—or (2) 
consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single federal 
regulator, such as CFPB.”31 However, the GAO was incapable of giving 
a complete recommendation as to which option Congress should 
select.32 Whereas Prosper lobbied the U.S. House of Representatives and 
the Senate to sponsor a provision under the Dodd–Frank Act that would 
have made the CFPB the main regulator of P2P lending, exempting their 
industry from securities regulation—the Senate refused to pass this 
provision.33 
3. U.S. Treasury White Paper 
In May 2016, Lending Club announced CEO Renaud Laplanche’s 
resignation “after an internal review found a sale of $22 million in near-
prime loans to a single investor which was in violation of company 
policy and the investor's ‘express instructions.’”34 Soon after, the U.S. 
Treasury Department (“Treasury”) published a white paper regarding its 
 
 28. Verstein, supra note 20, at 476. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010). 
 31. GAO-11-613, Person-to-Person Lending: New Regulatory Challenges Could Emerge as the 
Industry Grows, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 42 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11613.pdf. The CFPB is the acronym for the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. 
 32. Verstein, supra note 20, at 523. 
 33. Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 23, at 526.  
 34. Samantha Sharf, Lending Club CEO Resigns after Internal Sale Review, FORBES (May 9, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2016/05/09/lending-club-ceo-resigns-after-internal-
sale-review/#787143c570f2. 
9
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review of the online marketplace lending industry.35 This white paper 
“establishe[d] an overview of the evolving market landscape, review[ed] 
stakeholder opinions, and provide[d] policy recommendations,” while 
acknowledging “the benefits and risks associated with online 
marketplace lending” and highlighting “certain best practices applicable 
both to established and emerging market participants.”36  
In order to facilitate access to credit through the continued 
development of online marketplace lending, this white paper made 
recommendations to the federal government and private sector 
participants to support “more robust small business borrower protections 
and effective oversight”; ensure “sound borrower experience and back-
end operations”; promote “a transparent marketplace for borrowers and 
investors”; expand “access to credit through partnerships that ensure 
safe and affordable credit”; support “the expansion of safe and 
affordable credit through access to government-held data”; and facilitate 
“interagency coordination through the creation of a standing working 
group for online marketplace lending.”37 
4. OCC Guidance Paper 
In March 2016, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) issued a paper which provides a regulatory framework for 
responsible innovation, stressing “the importance of financial 
institutions being receptive to technological innovation, while 
emphasizing risk management and corporate governance.” 38  In 
December 2016, the OCC further announced that they would charter 
FinTech companies supplying bank services and products as “special 
 
 35. Opportunities and Challenges in Online Marketplace Lending, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY (2016). 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. Id. at 28-33. 
 38. Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC Perspective, 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsible-
innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf. See also Chip MacDonald, Lisa M. Ledbetter, Stephen 
J. Obie, James C. Olson, Heith D. Rodman, & William M. Atherton, The OCC’s Responsible Innovation 
Framework and Fintech Bank Charters—Latest Developments, JONES DAY (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.jonesday.com/the-occs-responsible-innovation-framework-and-fintech-bank-charterslatest-
developments-01-13-2017/. Under the OCC’s definition, responsible innovation means “the use of new 
or improved financial products, services, and processes to meet the evolving needs of consumers, 
businesses, and communities in a manner that is consistent with sound risk management and is aligned 
with the bank’s overall business strategy.” OCC, Responsibility Innovation, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/index-innovation.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2018).  
10
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purpose national banks.” 39  The announcement was followed by the 
OCC’s release of a guidance paper (the “Guiding Paper”), titled 
“Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech 
Companies,” which offered preliminary guidance on the process of the 
special purpose charter.40  
From a FinTech firm’s perspective, “the most significant benefit 
associated with such a charter would be that the application of many 
state laws to the firm would be preempted.”41 On the other hand, since 
the National Bank Act charters and governs all national banks, including 
special purpose national banks, a FinTech company with such a charter 
would be subject to “the provisions of the act that prescribe the bank’s 
corporate organization and structure (e.g., classes of shares, voting 
rights, number of directors, and term of office) and circumscribe the 
activities that the bank is permitted to conduct.”42 However, even if the 
OCC actually granted such FinTech charters, the type of company that 
would be regarded as a FinTech company is not clear yet.43 
C. Summary 
The Securities Act of 1933 provides that “the offer and sale of 
securities must be registered unless an exemption from registration is 
 
 39. Patrick Doyle, David F. Freeman, Jr., Brian McCormally, & Pratin Vallabhaneni, Arnold & 
Porter Discusses OCC Plan to Charter FinTech Firms as Special Purpose National Banks, The CLS 
Blue Sky Blog (Dec. 8, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/08/arnold-porter-discusses-
occ-plan-to-charter-fintech-firms-as-special-purpose-national-banks/. 
 40. OCC, Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-
charters-for-fintech.pdf. In July 2018, the OCC officially began accepting applications for special 
purpose national bank charters from “nondepository financial technology (fintech) companies engaged 
in the business of banking.” OCC, OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications 
From Financial Technology Companies, https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-
occ-2018-74.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). Nevertheless, a federal judge recently made the FinTech 
charter go into hibernation due to similar lawsuits brought by state banking regulators such as the New 
York Department of Financial Services.  Randall D. Guynn & Margaret 
E. Tahyar, The Fintech Charter Goes into Hibernation, DAVIS POLK (May 3, 2019), 
https://www.finregreform.com/single-post/2019/05/03/the-fintech-charter-goes-into-hibernation/. 
 41. Hilary J. Allen, A US Regulatory Sandbox?, 31 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3056993. 
 42. Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to Fintech 
Companies, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occ-to-issue-special-
purpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/. 
 43. The OCC only gives some examples: “marketplace lenders, payment services providers, 
digital currency and distributed ledger technology companies, and financial planning and wealth 
management companies.” Doyle, Freeman, McCormally, & Vallabhaneni, supra note 39. 
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available.” 44  For example, Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act of 2012 added Securities Act Section 4(a)(6), offering an 
exemption from registration for some crowdfunding transactions. 45 
Nevertheless, under the asset securitization model, P2P lending is out of 
the scope of the exemption of securities regulations. After the SEC 
started to regulate P2P lending platforms via the extant securities 
regulation, U.S. P2P platforms were required to sell the notes by 
prospectus and file annual and quarterly reports. Perhaps because of 
increased scrutiny by the SEC, P2P platforms such as Prosper and 
Lending Club increased their minimum required credit scores, which 
were “substantially higher than domestic microfinance institutions 
require.” Paradoxically, “the SEC’s effort to regulate the industry 
created barriers to entry for economically marginal and geographically 
isolated borrowers.”46  
Despite the fact that the GAO and U.S. Treasury used to consider 
how to supervise the growing FinTech industry in a more appropriate 
way, the OCC took the position in the Guidance Paper that if innovative 
products or services provided by FinTech firms are tantamount to 
traditional activities, like paying checks and lending money, such 
companies would be allowed to receive special purpose charters. 47 
Nonetheless, the OCC would charter FinTech firms and regulate them as 
banks by “impos[ing] capital requirements and ask[ing] firms to submit 
financial inclusion plans in the spirit of the Community Reinvestment 
Act, as well as resolution plans”; however, if FinTech startups were 
required to comply with this sort of regulation, they would spend too 
 
 44. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-
051316.htm (hereinafter Reg. CF). See also Tao Yu & Wei Shen, Funds Sharing Regulation in the 
Context of the Sharing Economy: Understanding the Logic of China’s P2P Lending Regulation, 35 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 42, 53 (2019) (describing that “[t]he P2P lending regulation in the US 
is a subdivision of securities regulation under which P2P lending platforms are treated as issuers by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)” whereas “the equivalent in the UK is similar to a banking 
regulatory system.”). 
 45. See Reg. CF, supra note 44.; Chang-hsien Tsai, Legal Transplantation or Legal Innovation? 
Equity Crowdfunding Regulation in Taiwan after Title III of the U.S. JOBS Act, 34 B.U. INT’L L.J. 233, 
236, 240-1, 245 (2016). 
 46. Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 309, 
345 (2013). 
 47. Nonaka, supra note 42. See also Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Sue OCC over Fintech 
Charter, American Banker (2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-regulators-sue-occ-
over-fintech-charter (“For [F]in[T]ech companies, the national charter could be an opportunity to skip 
the state-by-state licensing system and only deal with a single federal regulator and set of 
requirements.”). 
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much time and money.48 
II. P2P LENDING IN CHINA 
It is reported that P2P lending in China has “nearly quadrupled to a 
staggering $150 billion in 2015, more than ten times the size of US 
marketplace lending originations.”49 At the same time, however, those 
P2P platforms do not have the same restrictions as banks do, and 
because they are not registered as traditional financial intermediaries, 
there are substantial concerns about scandals, fraud, and other P2P 
failures.50 Some commentators compare the P2P lending transactions to 
“Ponzi schemes,” meaning that they “attract[] lenders through high 
interest rates, and us[e] the lent funds to pay off preceding lenders.”51 
The P2P lending industry in China illustrates how business models of 
online P2P lending from the Western world can evolve in a different and 
comparably less developed legal and regulatory environment.52 This is a 
market-oriented response to the limited opportunities open to smaller 
businesses for obtaining financial services from banks and to the low 
returns offered to savers or investors.53 We can categorize P2P lending 
in China into the following four major business models. 
 
 48. Allen, supra note 41, at 32. Similarly, as discussed below, Taiwanese financial authority, the 
FSC, highly encouraged the partnership between banks and P2P platforms; their purpose is also to 
govern P2P platforms via existing law and regulations applied to banks. See infra Parts III.B.1 and 
IV.D. 
 49. Alistair Milne & Paul Parboteeah, The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer 
Lending, EUROPEAN CREDIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 18 (May 2016), 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ECRI%20RR17%20P2P%20Lending.pdf.  
 50. See Matthew Miller & Richard Borsuk, China Issues Details of Rules to Tackle Online 
Financial Risk, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-finance-
internet/china-issues-details-of-rules-to-tackle-online-financial-risk-idUSKCN12D0UI; Sara Hsu, 
China’s Poor P2P Lending Models, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-poor-p2p-lending-models/.  
 51. See Hung-Yi Chen & Chang-hsien Tsai, Changing Regulations of Peer-to-Peer Lending in 
China, 36(11) BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 13, 16-17, 19-20 (2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166867; Hsu, supra note 50.  
 52. Milne & Parboteeah, supra note 49. 
 53. See Robin Hui Huang, Online P2P Lending and Regulatory Responses in China: 
Opportunities and Challenges, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 63, 65-68 (2018); Bonnie G. Buchanan & 
Cathy Xuying Cao, Quo Vadis? A Comparison of the Fintech Revolution in China and the West 19 
(SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2017-002, 2018), https://swiftinstitute.org/research/quo-vadis-a-
comparison-of-the-fintech-revolution-in-china-and-the-west/ (describing “[t]here is a general shortage 
of credit in China because banks prefer to lend to big SOEs.”). See also id, at 30 (taking Ezubao, “a 50 
billion yuan (USD 7.6 billion) pyramid scheme established in 2014 that eventually impacted 900,000 
investors in less than a two year period” as an example of a Ponzi scheme; attributing its continuing to 
accelerate the growth before its collapse in 2016 to that “Chinese investors sought alternatives to the 
volatile Chinese stock market and slowing real estate market”). 
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A. Major Business Models 
1. The Information Intermediation Model 
P2P platforms in China vary considerably. In the information 
intermediation model, P2P lending companies provide a platform as a 
trading market to match lenders and borrowers, letting them exchange 
information and make the direct trade themselves.54 Under this model, 
lenders bear all credit risks derived from borrowers, and the platforms 
do not provide guarantees or indemnities for borrowers’ defaults.55 For 
example, Paipaidai (拍拍貸), China’s first P2P lending platform, which 
was launched in 2007, introduced a bidding process to lending 
projects. 56  In this model, the loan interest is determined solely by 
borrowers and lenders. Meanwhile, lenders in the Paipaidai platform 
bear the default risk of the borrowers without guarantees given by the 
platform.57 
2. The Guarantee Model 
Under the guarantee model, a P2P platform not only matches lenders 
and borrowers but also provides guarantees for the lender’s principal 
and interests usually by cooperating with an associated guarantee 
company. 58  If a loan default occurs, the platform or the guarantee 
company compensates lenders and the lenders transfer the loan claims to 
the platform or the guarantee company for the follow-up debt 
 
 54. Liang Shan (單良 ), Jhongguodalu Wanglu Jiedai Pingtai Kuaisu Fajhan: Sihda P2P 
Wangdai Moshih Fensi (中國大陸網路借貸平台快速發展：4 大 P2P 網貸模式分析) [Rapid 
Development of Chinese Online Lending Platforms: An Analysis of the Four Major P2P Lending 
Models], 77 TAIWAN YINHANJIA (台灣銀行家) [THE TAIWAN BANKER] 46, 47 (2016). 
 55. Id.  
 56. A loan project is successful if the total loan amount is met within a limited period of time; if 
the full loan amount cannot be raised during the limited period, the loan project fails. Jing-Jie Jhang (張
靜婕) & Rong-Zong Jian (簡榮宗), P2P Daikuan Fuwu Pingtai Falu Wunti Chutan (P2P貸款服務平
台法律問題初探) [Preliminary Study on Legal Issues of P2P Lending Platforms], www.LawTw.com (
台灣法律網),  
http://www.lawtw.com/article.php?template=article_content&area=free_browse&parent_path=,1,1573,
&job_id=203436&article_category_id=2049&article_id=120368 (last visited May 6, 2018).  
 57. The information intermediation model is also called the “client segregated account model,” 
in which “all funds from lenders and borrowers are managed by a segregated account which is separated 
from the platform’s balance sheet.” Huang, supra note 53, at 70. 
 58. Shan, supra note 54, at 47. This model is also called the “guaranteed return model,” where 
“[a]s the platform plays a similar role to that of the traditional bank, this type of online lending is said to 
have ‘bank-like functions.’” Huang, supra note 52, at 71. 
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collection.59  Hongling Capital (紅岭創投), for example—one of the 
earlier P2P lending platforms in China, which was launched in 2009—60 
owns a guarantee company and “offers a wide range of loan products in 
both secured and unsecured categories offering yields of 7-10% to 
investors.”61  Before the Chinese government started to supervise the 
P2P lending industry more strictly in 2015, most P2P platforms in 
China, under competitive pressure from the market, provided guarantees 
for a loan’s principal and interests. 62  Those platforms, however, 
specified neither the source, usage, or scale of their reserves for 
guarantees, nor did they clarify whether or not the guarantees were 
provided only within the cap of the reserves.63 
3. The Asset Securitization Model 
Within the asset securitization model the financial institutions or 
other companies partition the assets, which can generate cash flow 
income, and then repackage them into a standard form of securities, 
creditworthiness of which is enhanced through appropriate internal or 
external credits. Those securities are finally sold to investors on the 
financial market, with Prosper and Lending Club as noted examples.64 In 
China, some guarantee companies and microfinance firms have 
established their own P2P platforms or collaborate with other P2P 
lending platforms to sell the guaranteed products or microfinance assets 
to the general public through the platforms.65 China’s Lufax (陸金所), 
originally incubated by Pingan Insurance Group, adopts a model similar 
to the asset securitization model explained above.66 Under this model, 
 
 59. See Shan, supra note 54, at 47; WANG JHIH-CHENG (王志誠 ) ET AL., HULIANGWANG 
JINRONG JHIH JIANLI JIJHIH (互聯網金融之監理機制) [THE SUPERVISION MECHANISM OF INTERNET 
FINANCE] 43-44 (2017). 
 60. Spencer Li, Are Chinese Platforms Abandoning the Peer-to-Peer Model?, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/12/78231-are-chinese-platforms-
abandoning-the-peer-to-peer-model/.  
 61. See id; TSAI-CHING LIU (劉彩卿) ET AL., JINRONG YANJIU FAZHAN JIJIN GUANLI WEIYUAN 
HUI (金融研究發展基金管理委員會) [FOUNDATION OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT], 
FEI YINHANGYE BANLI JINRONG YEWU ZHI GUOWAI FAZHAN QUSHI JI YINYING ZHIDAO (非銀行業辦
理金融業務之國外發展趨勢及因應之道) [FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT TREND OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
PROVIDED BY THE NON-BANK INDUSTRY AND THE SOLUTIONS] 13, 53 (2015) (hereinafter NON-BANK 
INDUSTRY). 
 62. See Siang-Rong Ye (葉湘榕), P2P Jiedai De Moshih Fongsian Yu Jianguan Yanjiou (P2P借
貸的模式風險與監管研究) [Research on Model Risk and Supervision of P2P Lending], 3 JINRONG 
JIANGUAN YANJIOU (金融監管研究) [FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY RESEARCH] 73 (2014); Buchanan & 
Cao, supra note 53, at 30.  
 63. Ye, supra note 62.  
 64. See supra Part I.A; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 42-44.  
 65. Shang, supra note 54, at 47. 
 66. See Li, supra note 60; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 44; Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 49. 
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special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) or trust funds are formed as 
bankruptcy remote entities to isolate financial risks from the platforms, 
thus protecting investors’ interests.67 
4. The Debt Assignment Model 
Under the debt assignment model, a lender, in cooperation with a P2P 
platform, provides loans to borrowers and then sells the loan claims to 
investors on the platform; this way, investors and borrowers do not 
transact directly.68 CreditEase or Yixin (宜信) adopts this model to lend 
money to borrowers on the platform before finding investors to channel 
their funds into loans. 69  Yixin’s CEO, Ning Tang, as an individual 
lender, lends his money to borrowers whose credit ratings were certified 
through Yixin’s offline credit verification process. Thereafter, Yixin 
splits the loans and packages them into products which investors can 
buy from Tang Ning on the Yixin platform.70 Although some scholars 
argue that bankruptcy remote entities such as SPVs or trust funds 
differentiate the asset securitization model from the debt assignment 
model,71 others maintain that these two models are actually the same.72 
B. The Regulatory Framework 
Following several years of rapid growth in internet finance, 73  the 
Chinese government gave up its previous hands-off approach to 
monitoring online financial products or services after the outbreak of 
scandal, fraud, and high-profile P2P failures. In fact, in July 2015, the 
Chinese government introduced its first major guidance policy on 
 
 67. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 42-43.  
 68. This model is also called the “platform lender model,” “originate-to-distribute model,” or 
“market place lending,” where “the platform is the one who originates loans to the borrowers . . . 
proactively without the need for the matches to actually occur.” Huang, supra note 53, at 71. 
 69. Hsu, supra note 50.  
 70. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 41. See also Hsu, supra note 50 (“Under this model, the 
investors may end up lending to several borrowers, or several investors may lend to one borrower. In 
some cases, loans are pooled and the debt is transferred to investors.”).  
 71. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 72. See, e.g., Wen Xiao-Bo (文曉博), P2P Zhaiquan Liuzhuan Yu Zichan Zhengquanhua De 
Falu Fenxi (P2P 債權流轉與資產證券化的法律分析) [Legal Analysis of P2P claims Transfer and 
Asset Securitization], 1 FAZHI YU SHEHUI (法制與社會) [LEGAL SYSTEM AND SOCIETY] 99, 100 
(2015).  
 73. The so-called internet finance in China means “a joint product of internet and the financial 
sector,” which is “more commonly referred to as Fin[T]ech in other jurisdictions.” See Huang, supra 
note 53, at 64. 
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internet finance as explained below.74  
1. Guiding Opinions on Enhancing Positive Development of Internet 
Finance 
The Guiding Opinions on Enhancing Positive Development of 
Internet Finance (the “Guiding Opinions”) is “a broad framework that 
‘actively encourages the development of internet finance platforms’ and 
is intended to ‘encourage innovation and support the steady 
development of internet finance’ with ‘moderately loose regulatory 
policies.’”75 Under the Guiding Opinions, P2P platforms are designated 
as information intermediaries for borrowers and lenders: they shall 
neither participate in the transaction, nor shall they pool or transform 
financial assets in any other way.76  According to the requirement of 
establishing custodian accounts (independent from platforms) with a 
“qualified banking institution,” the Guiding Opinions “appointed the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) as [the] P2P lending 
supervisory agency.” 77  Based on the overall requirements and 
supervisory principles provided under the Guiding Opinions, China’s 
government introduced additional regulatory measures discussed below. 
 
 74. See The Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending in China: An Overview and Survey Case Study, THE 
ASSOCIATION OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS 20 (2015), 
http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/ACCA_Global/Technical/manage/ea-china-p2p-lending.pdf 
(hereinafter Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending); Miller & Borsuk, supra note 50. For the Chinese “zen” 
approach to emerging FinTech practices by doing nothing, see Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 50 
(“China is often applauded for adopting a laissez-faire approach before designing a comprehensive 
regulatory system approach for the new environment. . . . In practice, this meant that China’s need for 
regulatory sandboxes was limited, as China itself represented a sandbox on a national level.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
 75. Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending, supra note 74, at 20.  
 76. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO CAIZHENG BU ZHONGGUO RENMIN YINHANG (中國
人民銀行 ) [PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA] ET AL., GUANYU CUJIN HULIANWAN JINRONG JIANKANG 
FAZHAN DE ZHIDAO YIJIAN (關於促進互聯網金融健康發展的指導意見) [GUIDING OPINIONS ON 
ENHANCING POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNET FINANCE] (promulgated and effective July 18, 2015) 
(China) (hereinafter GUIDING OPINIONS); Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending, supra note 74, at 20.  
 77. See id; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 20. In March of 2018, the CBRC and China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (“CIRC”) were merged and is now be known as the China Banking and 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”), where the People's Bank of China (“PBOC”) “will take 
over the legislative and rulemaking functions of the CBRC and CIRC, a significant increase in power, 
while CBIRC . . . will play the role of policy executor.” Angelito P. Bautista Jr, China Merges Its 
Banking and Insurance Regulators, THE ASIAN BANKER (Apr. 25, 2018), 
http://www.theasianbanker.com/updates-and-articles/china-merges-its-banking-and-insurance-
regulators. 
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2. Interim Measures for the Administration of the Business Activities of 
Online Lending Information Intermediary Institutions 
In August 2016, the CBRC issued the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Business Activities of Online Lending 
Information Intermediary Institutions (the “Interim Measures”). The 
purposes of the Interim Measures are to regulate the business activities 
of P2P lending, to protect the legal rights and interests of lenders, 
borrowers, and platforms, to promote the sound development of the 
online lending industry, and to satisfy the investment and financing 
demands of small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) and 
individuals in a more effective manner. The Interim Measures reaffirm 
that P2P platforms should be positioned as information intermediaries 
for borrowers and lenders. 78  According to the measures, the P2P 
platforms must be recorded and registered with local financial 
regulatory departments after obtaining their business licenses from 
company registries.79 In November 2016, the CBRC, together with the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce, issued the Guidelines on the 
Administration of Recordation and Registration of Online Lending 
Information Intermediary Institutions (the “Registration Guidelines”).80 
The Registration Guidelines reaffirm that the competent authority only 
processes registration and filing of the P2P lending companies’ basic 
information and does not endorse their operating capabilities, 
compliance, and credit status.81 
The Chinese regulatory approach may be described as relatively 
flexible and hands-off in terms of the creation of online lending 
platforms, aside from “cases of major risk events and outright criminal 
 
 78. See ZHONGGUO YINHANGYE JIANDU GUANLI WEIYUANHUI (中國銀行業監督管理委員會) 
[CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION] ET AL., WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU YEWU 
HUODONG GUANLI ZHANGXING BANFA (網絡借貸信息中介機構業務活動管理暫行辦法) [INTERIM 
MEASURES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF ONLINE LENDING INFORMATION 
INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS] (hereinafter INTERIM MEASURES) (promulgated and effective Aug. 24, 
2016) (China); Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 20. 
 79. See INTERIM MEASURES § 5; Huang, supra note 53, at 73.  
 80. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU BEIAN DENGJI GUANLI ZHIYIN (網絡借貸
信息中介機構備案登記管理指引) [GUIDELINES FOR FILING AND REGISTRATION OF ONLINE LENDING 
INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS], WANGDAIZHIJIA (網貸之家), http://baike.wdzj.com/doc-
view-4284.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 81. See Huang, supra note 53, at 73 (“As the Chinese regime adopts a registration procedure 
rather than an approval process, the platform can get registered as long as they provide all relevant 
supporting materials.”). 
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violations.”82 The Interim Measures still prefer market forces illustrated 
by industry self-regulation; in fact, “regulators are more interested in 
controlling undesired activities rather than setting legal barriers to entry 
(e.g., a license and permit system).” 83  While the new regulatory 
requirements for P2P lending providers are relatively hands-off, the 
CBRC officials have foreshadowed a list of 12 forbidden activities as 
red lines for the P2P lending industry.84 These 12 forbidden activities 
are “the focus of the draft rules as engaging in any of these will likely 
result in a complete shutdown of operations and possible prosecution by 
law enforcement.”85 
To name a few forbidden activities mentioned above, according to the 
Interim Measures, P2P platforms shall not provide lenders with 
guarantees or promise “guaranteed returns on principal and interest,” not 
directly make loans to borrowers, and not structure “loans into 
investment products with maturity mismatch.”86 In addition, the Interim 
Measures require that P2P platforms shall not accept and manage 
lenders’ funds, or build the “fund pool”; instead they must distinguish 
sub-accounts for their clients and establish a third-party depository 
system for customer funds with a qualified banking institution. 87  In 
other words, the information intermediation model becomes the only 
one that meets the aforementioned requirements, outlawing the 
aforementioned debt assignment, asset securitization, and guarantee 
models.88  
In order to protect consumers, P2P platforms shall manage and grade 
the risk tolerance levels of the lenders while controlling the loan amount 
within a certain limit. 89  Moreover, platforms shall fully disclose 
borrowers’ basic information, loan products, rating process, the funds 
used in the unexpired loan products and other related information, while 
periodically making public their financial conditions and business 
 
 82. See Spencer Li, Regulations Galore Part II: Peer to Peer Lending in China, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/01/80326-regulations-galore-part-ii-
peer-to-peer-lending-in-china/; Huang, supra note 53, at 73. See also Buchanan & Cao, supra note 53, at 
43 (noting that “[i]n the early days of the Chinese P2P market Chinese regulators had taken a hands-off 
approach to regulating online consumer loans.”); Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 49 (describing that 
“[f]rom 2006 (when CreditEase, the first Chinese P2P lending company, was founded) to 2015, China’s 
regulators employed a laissez faire approach towards this burgeoning and emerging industry.”). 
 83. See Li, supra note 82; Huang, supra note 53, at 73. 
 84. INTERIM MEASURES § 10.  
 85. Li, supra note 82.  
 86. INTERIM MEASURES § 10.  
 87. See INTERIM MEASURES § 28; Huang, supra note 53, at 74; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 
21. 
 88. See Huang, supra note 53, at 72 (underscoring that “the online lending platform cannot act as 
a financial intermediary”). 
 89. INTERIM MEASURES §§ 17 & 26.  
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operations. 90  Local regulators can scrutinize poorly rated platforms; 
depending on the type of non-compliance these platforms can or cannot 
be held accountable.91 Meanwhile, local regulators should advise P2P 
lending platforms on how to meet the requirements or shut down 
disqualified platforms.92 
3. Guidelines for Online Lending Fund Depository Business 
Due to the absence of third-party supervision of P2P lending in China 
in the previous years, many P2P platforms constructed fund pools, 
encroaching or misappropriating customers’ funds, and even absconding 
with the funds, severely damaging customers’ interests.93 By the end of 
2016, only 4% of the total number of platforms operate with the bank 
depository system. 94  As both the Guiding Opinions and Interim 
Measures require P2P platforms to establish a third-party depository 
system for customer funds with a qualified banking institution, in 
February of 2017, the CBRC further issued Guidelines for Online 
Lending Fund Depository Business (the “Depository Guidelines”) to 
specify the principles of fund depository business. 95  The Depository 
Guidelines stipulate that customer funds and platform self-owned funds 
shall be kept and managed separately, and that commercial banks as 
custodians “do not provide guarantee for online lending activities and 
will not be held liable for lending defaults.”96 
4. Self-regulatory Rules of Information Disclosure 
In October 2016, in order to meet the requirement from the Guiding 
Opinions and the Interim Measures, the National Internet Finance 
Association of China (the “NIFAC”)—organized by the People’s Bank 
of China (“PBOC”) along with related regulatory agencies—issued self-
regulations for information disclosure (the “Self-Regulations”) to 
 
 90. INTERIM MEASURES §§30-32. For detailed introduction to information disclosure, see Huang, 
supra note 53, at 75-76; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 21. 
 91. Li, supra note 82. 
 92. INTERIM MEASURES §44. 
 93. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI ZIJIN CUNGUAN YEWU ZHIYIN DA JIZHE WEN (網絡借貸資金存
管業務指引答記者問) [ANSWERS TO JOURNALISTS’ QUESTIONS ON GUIDELINES FOR ONLINE LENDING 
FUND DEPOSITORY BUSINESS] (2017), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/A5A5F5AB66FA4E74A9988D07C79B7BCB.html 
(last visited July 12, 2018). 
 94. Id. 
 95. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI ZIJIN CUNGUAN YEWU ZHIYIN (網絡借貸資金存管業務指引) 
[GUIDELINES FOR ONLINE LENDING FUND DEPOSITORY BUSINESS] (promulgated and effective Feb. 22, 
2017) (China). 
 96. See Huang, supra note 53, at 74-75. 
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increase information transparency and enable the investing public to 
jointly monitor and prevent fraud or moral hazard. 97  The Self-
Regulations propose 96 disclosure indicators, including 65 mandatory 
indicators and 31 encouraged indicators.98 The Self-Regulations divide 
the indicators into three types of information: institutional information, 
operational information, and information on loan projects. 99  The 
information disclosure obligations vary with the scale of platforms.100 
That is, larger platforms with more risks bear higher disclosure 
obligations. The NIFAC has set a threshold in the application process 
for membership, which requires the platform to disclose the information 
for more than three months according to the Self-Regulations.101 If false 
or fraudulent information is disclosed, the platform becomes ineligible 
for membership within two years of such disclosure.102 
C. Summary 
The business models of P2P lending in China are diverse, and each 
model may come with different kinds or levels of risks. For instance, 
“[c]redit risk is compounded in cases where the principal has been 
guaranteed, and P2P lenders may rapidly face a crisis of liquidity or 
 
 97. GUIDING OPINIONS §19; INTERIM MEASURES §34. The NIFAC, as a semi-private regulator, 
was established in December 2015 for regulating the internet finance industry, which includes P2P 
lending, under its self-regulatory rules. Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 21. 
 98. ZHONGGUO HULIANGWANG JINRONG XIEHUI (中國互聯網金融協會) [NATIONAL INTERNET 
FINANCE ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], Zhongguo Huliangwang Jinrong Xiehui Huliangwang Jinrong Xinxi 
Pilu Zilu Guanli Guifan (中國互聯網金融協會互聯網金融信息披露自律管理規範 [NIFAC Rule on 
Self-Regulation of Information Disclosure], Wang Dai Zhi Jia ( 網貸之家 ) [Wangdaizhijia], 
http://www.wdzj.com/zhuanti/xpbz/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (hereinafter Self-Regulations). 
ZHONGGUO HULIANGWANG JINRONG XIEHUI (中國互聯網金融協會) [NATIONAL INTERNET FINANCE 
ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], Hu Liang Wang Jin Rong Xin Xi Pi Lu Biao Zhun: P2P Wang Dai (互聯網金
融信息披露標準：P2P 網貸) [Standard on Internet Financial Information Disclosure for Online 
Lending], Wang Dai Zhi Jia (網貸之家) [Wangdaizhijia], http://www.wdzj.com/zhuanti/xpbz/ (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2018) (hereinafter Standards). To more officially list in detail the disclosure 
requirements the P2P lending platforms should obey, CBRC promulgated the “Disclosure Guidelines” 
in August of 2017. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU YEWU HUODONG XINXI PILU 
ZHIYIN (網絡借貸信息中介機構業務活動信息披露指引) [GUIDELINES FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF 
INFORMATION ON THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF ONLINE LENDING INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY 
INSTITUTIONS] (promulgated and effective Aug. 23, 2017) (China). Therefore, commentators indicate 
that the “existing Chinese regulations constitute a “One + Three” regulatory system for the P2P lending 
industry”, that the “One” is the “Interim Measures” of 2016, and that the “Three” refers to the 
“Registration Guidelines” of 2016, the “Depository Guidelines” of 2017, and the “Disclosure 
Guidelines” of 2017. Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 50-52. 
 99. See Standards, supra note 98. For detailed examples of these three types, see Huang, supra 
note 53, at 76. 
 100. See Standards, supra note 98.  
 101. Self-Regulations, supra note 98, §2. 
 102. Self-Regulations, supra note 98, §27. 
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solvency when borrowers become delinquent.”103 In addition, under the 
asset securitization and debt assignment models, “the investors may end 
up lending to several borrowers, or several investors may lend to one 
borrower. In some cases, loans are pooled and the debt is transferred to 
investors.”104 In these cases, the P2P lending company has additional 
responsibility to ensure the credibility of borrowers.105  
Given the rapid development of internet finance, the Chinese 
regulators initially were more interested in cracking down on undesired 
activities, rather than imposing legal barriers to entry such as a licensure 
regime. 106  A list of 12 forbidden activities in the Interim Measures 
represents the primary focus of the regulators, for the purposes to 
“promote risk management and establish much-needed ground rules to 
limit the prevalence of unsound practices and illegal activity in the 
industry.”107 Industry self-regulation is touted in the document as the 
ideal approach.108 Since the Chinese government made it clear that “P2P 
platforms should be positioned as information intermediaries” only, 
“mainstream P2P products have been standardized to the extent that they 
are defined as assets reflecting actual lending relationship.” 109 
Accordingly, as both the Guiding Opinions and the Interim Measures 
emphasize that P2P lending companies shall act as information 
intermediaries, P2P platforms can only adopt the information 
intermediation model. However, it may be disputed that other models, 
not least the asset securitization and debt assignment models, should be 
completely forbidden simply because they imply more potential risks. 
Though others may suggest that, in the meantime, the competent 
authorities should, to an extent, allow these models with the premises of 
appropriate supervision in terms of containing potential systemic risk 
 
 103. Hsu, supra note 50. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Li, supra note 82.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Nevertheless, a large number of P2P lending platforms in China collapsed in June and 
July of 2018, causing many defaults. Chen Jia, Regulator to Clamp Down on P2P Loans, Stock as 
Collateral, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 28, 2018), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/28/WS5b849353a310add14f388102.html. Thus, it is expected 
that China’s financial regulators would further tighten regulation on internet finance; for example, new 
regulations were announced in August 2018, requiring that local governments “set up ‘communications 
windows’ where investors can complain, that “[n]ew P2P companies and platforms are strictly banned”, 
and that “[t]hose that do not repay their loans will be blacklisted under China’s social-credit rating 
system.” Amanda Erickson, Chinese Anger Grows As ‘Get Rich Quick’ Investment Schemes Go Bust, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-
anger-grows-as-get-rich-quick-investment-schemes-go-bust/2018/08/29/4a1cd5a2-a45b-11e8-b76b-
d513a40042f6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d98647e2779a. 
 109. P2P Lending Market in China, BOAO REVIEW & LUFAX.COM 14, http://blog.lendit.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Lufax-white-paper-Chinese-P2P-Market.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
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and protecting consumer interest. Next, we will examine P2P lending in 
Taiwan, laying foundation for a comparison among the United States, 
China, and Taiwan regarding regulatory responses to P2P lending, in 
particular, and FinTech, in general.110 
III. P2P LENDING IN TAIWAN 
P2P lending in Taiwan developed quite a while later than in the 
United States and China. One reason for this is that financial institutions 
in Taiwan did not experience tightened monetary conditions nor did they 
feel the credit crunch; therefore, financial consumers did not face the 
urgent need to find alternative financing channels after the GFC in 
2008. 111  Also, individuals in Taiwan perceive savings and personal 
credit differently than those in Europe and the United States. In Taiwan, 
most people with saving habits have less demand for short-term 
microfinance (such as tuition fees, housing repairs, and travel funds), 
and people with funds are less willing to lend money to others without 
trust and full information.112 In addition, Taiwanese financial regulations 
have always been formulated in a positive-list approach, meaning that 
only financial products or services that have been evaluated and 
approved by competent authorities would be permitted in trade. 113 
Therefore, without specific applicable regulations, Taiwan’s P2P 
platforms remain on the sidelines or underground, fearing the potential 
violations of laws and regulations and the following legal 
enforcement.114  
The FSC, the sole watchdog for the whole financial market in 
Taiwan, has said that, in spite of the widespread advanced internet 
technology, the financial market in Taiwan is relatively smaller than in 
the United States and China; therefore, competition between financial 
 
 110. See infra Part IV.A. 
 111. According to the statistics from the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the loan 
balances of major banking institutions have grown year by year; despite experiencing the GFC in 2008, 
the annual growth rate of loans and investments still increased. NON-BANK INDUSTRY, supra note 61, at 
64-66. 
 112. Id. at 77. 
 113. Gu Xiang-Yi (谷湘儀) & Xu Ying-Shu (徐瑩書), P2P Wanglu Jiedai Pingtai Zhi Falu 
Wenti (P2P網路借貸平臺之法律問題) [Legal Issues of P2P Lending Platforms], in CAIJIN FA: XIN 
SHANGZHAN JIYUAN (財經法：新商戰紀元) [FINANCIAL LAW: NEW BUSINESS WAR ERA] 209, 220-21 
(LCS & Partners eds., 2016). 
 114. Id. 
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institutions in Taiwan is highly intense. 115  The FSC also states that 
Taiwanese financial institutions such as banks, credit unions, and credit 
departments in local farmers’ and fishermen’s associations provide 
ample capital and various types of loan projects to meet diverse 
financing needs for individuals and SMEs at reasonable interest rates.116 
With concerns about current circumstances of over-banking, the FSC 
hesitated to decide whether to formally authorize the P2P lending 
industry in Taiwan.117 
On the other hand, not all borrowers are satisfied with services 
provided by traditional financial institutions; even though there are 
many banks in Taiwan, financial products introduced by banks are quite 
similar.118 Since the banks’ loan approval standards are too strict for 
many borrowers, those who fail to meet these high standards can only 
borrow money from the underground financial market.119 SMEs, online 
micro businesses, and start-ups in culture and creativity industries 
emerging in recent years find it difficult to evaluate their output value in 
their infancy and, in turn, find it difficult to get loans from traditional 
banks.120 Such entrepreneurs may address their financing demands via 
alternative financing channels, e.g., P2P lending platforms. Specifically, 
recent research reports state that “[a]cross the period 2013-2016 the 
average annual growth rate for the alternative finance industry in 
Taiwan was close to 200%”; thus, “peer-to-peer business lending was by 
far the leading alternative finance model with $42.5 million raised in 
 
 115. See Zhen-Ling Peng (彭禎伶), Kaifang P2P Jinrong Zeng Min-Zong: Fengxian Xu Zifu (開
放 P2P金融 曾銘宗：風險須自負) [If P2P Finance Liberalized, Consumers Should Be at Their Own 
Risk, Zeng Min-Zong Said.], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO (中國時報 ) [CHINA TIMES] (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150717000044-260202; Bing-Hang Fan (范秉航 ), Cong 
Dianfushi De Chuangxin Kan Shuwei Jinrong Langchao Xia De Taiwan (從顛覆式的創新，看數位金
融浪潮下的台灣) [Look at Taiwan on the Digital Financial Waves from the Perspective of Disruptive 
Innovation], TAIWAN JINGJI YANJIU YUAN (台灣經濟研究院) [TAIWAN INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH] (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.tier.org.tw/comment/pec5010.aspx?GUID=bb31ae61-a3f1-
44a6-9353-5d6ff25c9288. 
 116. JINRONG JIANDU GUANLI WEIYUAN HUI (金融監督管理委員會) [FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY 
COMMISSION R.O.C.], JIN RONG KE JI FA ZHAN CE LUE BAIPI SHU (金融科技發展策略白皮書) 
[FINTECH DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WHITE PAPER] 26 (2016) (Taiwan) (hereinafter WHITE PAPER). 
 117. See Peng, supra note 115; Fan, supra note 115.  
 118. Huang Qi-Xiu (黃麒修), Con Luo Ji Tui Lun Kan Tai Wan FinTech Chan Ye Fa Zhan (從邏
輯推論看台灣 FinTech 產業發展) [A Perspective of Logic on FinTech Industrial Development in 
Taiwan], TAIWAN ZIJIN JIAOYI SUO (台灣資金交易所) [TAIWAN FUND EXCHANGE] (May 2, 2017), 
http://blog.taiwanfundexchange.com.tw/?p=726. 
 119. Id. 
 120. NON-BANK INDUSTRY, supra note 61, at 78-79. 
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2016.”121 
A. Business Models Exemplified 
In May 2016, the FSC released the FinTech Development Strategy 
White Paper (the “White Paper”) with aims to help “innovate the digital 
technology and create . . . smart finance.”122 The White Paper states that 
P2P lending provides a direct lending intermediary where the process of 
private lending or retail finance market is quickly facilitated, and that in 
the meantime, through Big Data analysis, P2P platforms have 
established a forecasting mechanism to detect the credit risks earlier and 
address them effectively.123 What P2P lending companies do—matching 
both parties in private lending contracts—falls outside the definition of 
any financial business requiring ex ante authorization from the FSC 
under Taiwanese financial laws.124 The aforementioned statement may 
suggest that P2P lending would (or should) merely act as an information 
intermediary in the FSC’s mindset. Next, we examine business models 
of current P2P lending companies operating in Taiwan. 
1. The Information Intermediation Model 
Platforms that adopt the information intermediation model are 
information intermediaries that match lenders and borrowers, and do not 
arrange loans or get repayments from both sides. Lending parties make 
loans through banks or licensed third-party payment institutions. Lend & 
Borrow (“LnB”) offers an example to illustrate that borrowers first 
signal their loan demands and disclose their credit information for 
reviewing by the platform; thereafter, the platform assesses the loan 
interest rate and posts the loan application to the website for lenders to 
shop.125 After creating a lending contract, lenders and borrowers would 
be notified of bank account numbers of their counterparties, which have 
been verified by the platform for loan making and repayment. 126 
Nevertheless, even if LnB is not involved in the cash flow between 
 
 121. Yunyu Chengchang: Dier Ci Yatai Dicyu Wanglu Tidai Jinrong Hangye Baogao (孕育成長
：第二期亞太地區網路替代金融行業報告 ) [Cultivating Growth: The 2nd Asia Pacific Region 
Alternative Finance Industry Report], JIANQIAO DAXUE XINXING JINRONG YANJIU ZONGXIN (劍橋大學
新興金融研究中心 ) [CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALTERNATIVE FINANCE], 66 (2017) (hereinafter 
Cultivating Growth). 
 122. WHITE PAPER, supra note 116, at 1.  
 123. Id. at 25. 
 124. Id. at 26. 
 125. XINYONG SHIJI (信用市集) [Lend & Borrower], LnB Yunzuo Moshi (LnB運作模式) [How 
LnB Works], https://www.lnb.com.tw/how-it-works.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
 126. Id. 
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lenders and borrowers, providing guarantees for at least 70% of a loan’s 
principal is part of LnB’s business model. 127  Under its model, LnB 
provides guarantees for the lender’s principal to a large extent by 
creating a trust of “guaranteed returns on principal.” When the loan 
default occurs, the platform compensates lenders with the reserve from 
the trust, and lenders transfer the loan claims to the platform or the 
associated asset management company for subsequent debt collection.128 
2. The Debt Assignment Model 
Some of the P2P platforms in Taiwan seem to adopt the debt 
assignment model, where borrowers receive loans from lenders who 
then sell the loans to investors through the platform, such as 
Siangmindai.129 Taiwan’s debt assignment model, however, is different 
from its counterpart in China.130 Specifically, Siangmindai does not lend 
money to borrowers in the name of the chief executive of the P2P 
lending company in the first place; it also does not divide the loans and 
package them into products that investors can buy on the platform. 
Instead, “advanced” members on the platform as lenders satisfy 
borrowers’ loan demands in full, and may choose to hold the loans until 
the expiry dates or, earlier, split and sell loan claims to the “general” 
members on the platform.131 The platform itself is not involved in the 
cash flow of lending activities.132  
B. Legal Issues 
1. The Regulatory Background 
Due to the lack of customized regulations applicable to P2P lending, 
the FSC can only remind investors of the potential investment risks on 
P2P lending platforms, require those platforms to play a role of mere 
information intermediaries that match borrowers and lenders in a private 
lending contractual relationship under the Civil Code, and closely 
monitor those platforms to determine whether they cross red lines drawn 
 
 127. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 54, 60. In this sense, LnB’s business model is similar to the 
guarantee model in China. See Part II.A.2. 
 128. XIANG-YI (GRACE) GU (谷湘儀) ET AL., JIN RONG KE JI FA ZHAN YU FU LU (金融科技發展
與法律) [THE FINTECH DEVELOPMENT AND THE LAW] 161, 163 (2017). 
 129. SIANGMINDAI ( 鄉 民 貸 ), Yunzuo Fangshi ( 運 作 方 式 ) [How It Works], 
https://www.lend.com.tw/work.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
 130. See Part II.A.4. 
 131. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 54, 57-58; GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 161-62. 
 132. See SIANGMINDAI, supra note 129. 
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under the Security and Exchange Act (“SEA”), the Banking Act, the Act 
Governing Electronic Payment Institutions (the “EPI Act”),133 and the 
Financial Asset Securitization Act (the “FASA”).134 The FSC evaluated 
regulatory approaches to the P2P lending sector in May 2016, including 
enacting a specified act or amending the EPI Act to govern this sector.135 
However, officials finally decided that no statutes would be enacted or 
amended since P2P lending was characterized as pure private lending. 
Meanwhile, the FSC highly encouraged banks and P2P platforms to 
collaborate with each other, with a view to strengthening internal 
controls of those platforms and, in turn, lowering operational risks.136  
2. The Information Intermediation Model 
As mentioned above, under the information intermediation model, a 
loan contract is signed by both lenders and borrowers, and the platform 
does not intervene in the cash flow. All platforms would (or should) do 
is match borrowers and lenders, instead of accepting deposits, because 
such banking activities as accepting deposits shall be licensed by the 
financial authority in advance. 137  Therefore, P2P platforms function 
merely as brokers—a role that is governed under the Civil Code and its 
case law.138 For example, Taiwan’s Civil Code stipulates that the loan 
interest rate shall not exceed 20 percent per annum. 139  In addition, 
 
 133. Aiming to encourage the development of online financial innovations, the EPI Act was 
enacted in February 2015 to regulate online stored payments by non-banks after almost two years of 
discussions and debates between the financial authority and platforms. This EPI Act is known as the 
third-party payment law in Taiwan, providing a thorough legal basis for electronic payment services to 
be provided by third-party intermediaries on the internet. 
 134. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 212-14. 
 135. Cultivating Growth, supra note 121, at 68.  
 136. See id; Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Guan Hui Bei Cha Yin Hang Yu 
Wang Lu Jie Dai Ping Tai Ye Zhe He Zuo Zi Lu Gui Fan [Financial Supervisory Commission Files for 
Future Reference Self-Regulatory Rules on Collaboration between Banks and P2P Lending Platforms] 
(Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01712070001&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News 
(noting that the FSC adopts the regulatory approach to P2P lending of “encouraging” collaboration 
between banks and P2P lending platforms by directing Taiwan’s Bankers Association to write their self-
regulatory rules, while requiring P2P platforms not to cross red lines drawn under existing laws such as 
the SEA, the Banking Act, the EPI Act, and the FASA). When it comes to regulatory approaches to P2P 
lending, “[t]he regulation of P2P lending in the US is a security-based system while the equivalent in the 
UK is similar to a banking regulatory system.” Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 53. The FSC’s “four-red-
line” approach is arguably a combination of securities and banking regulatory models, as the SEA and 
the FASA are under the securities regulation while the Banking Act and the EPI Act are part of the 
banking regime.  
 137. Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 226-28.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Minfa (民法 ) [Civil Code] §205 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930) 
(Taiwan). 
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platforms shall accurately report the contractual matters of the proposed 
transaction to each party insofar as they know these matters, while not 
acting as an intermediary for a person who is notoriously insolvent or 
who does not have capacity to enter into the proposed contract.140 Also, 
the platform has investigative duties regarding the contractual matters of 
the proposed transaction and the solvency or capacity of each party to 
enter into the proposed contract.141 On the other hand, in the case of 
LnB, as it provides guarantees for lenders’ principal to a large extent, it 
is uncertain whether it still acts as a pure information intermediary.142 
3. The Debt Assignment Model 
a. Illegal Deposit Accepting 
Due to the financial vulnerability and externality inherent in the 
banking business operated by financial intermediaries, bank runs or 
bankruptcies are likely to impact the stability of the overall financial 
system.143 As banks accept deposits from the general public and then 
lend the money to borrowers, their business model is highly financially 
leveraged where the banks do not own ample private funds. 144 
Therefore, banking services are always regulated by the competent 
authorities prudentially. 145  As for the supervision of financial 
institutions, the competent authority usually adopts a licensure regime; 
only those regulated under banking law are authorized to accept 
deposits.146 In light of the fact that accepting deposits is a bank’s core 
business and may have a wide range of impacts, in order to protect 
depositors’ interests, Taiwan’s Banking Act expressly restricts that, 
unless otherwise provided by law, any institutions other than banks shall 
not accept deposits. 147  If P2P platforms undertake fund pooling to 
control the funds solicited from lenders, then it will no longer be merely 
 
 140. Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] §567, para. 1 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930, 
as amended Apr. 21, 1999) (Taiwan). 
 141. Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] §567, para. 2 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930, 
as amended Apr. 21, 1999) (Taiwan). 
 142. See GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 170-71; Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 231. 
 143. Jun-Yan Jiang (江俊彥), Weifa Xijin Anjian Xingshi Guifan Zhi Yanjiu (違法吸金案件刑事
規範之研究：以銀行法與證交法間之體系違反為中心) [Study on Unauthorized Fund-Raising: 
Focusing on the Conflict between Banking Act and Securities and Exchange Act], 230 FAXUE CONGKAN 
(法學叢刊) [LAW JOURNAL] 133, 147 (2013). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 165. 
 147. YinHang Fa (銀行法) [Banking Act] §29-1 (promulgated and effective July 17, 1989) 
(Taiwan). 
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an information intermediary that matches lenders and borrowers; 
instead, it would be an institution that collects deposits from the general 
public, which may violate Articles 5-1, 29, 29-1, and 125 of the Banking 
Act.148  
Under the debt assignment model in China,149 a few P2P platforms 
such as Hongling Capital “developed a secondary market dedicated to 
their own products in a bid to increase product or debt liquidity, 
allowing creditors owning outstanding loans to trade remaining debts 
publicly for early investment recovery.” 150  In Taiwan, if funds are 
provided to borrowers through an associated or cooperative entity such 
as banks or third-party payment institutions on a P2P platform, the 
matching business may not be deemed the business exclusively 
permitted for banks, which shall be ex ante authorized by the competent 
authority. 151  Nevertheless, in the case of the debt assignment model 
illustrated by Siangmindai in Taiwan, 152  a question remains: even 
though lenders and borrowers are required to register with the platform 
to be a member for subsequent trades and only if a loan contract is 
entered into will funds be provided, would its business model fall within 
the element of “the general public” stipulated under Articles 5-1 and 29-
1 of the Banking Act? According to Taiwan’s Supreme Court, whenever 
persons approached to solicit funds are not specified and the number of 
people may increase anytime, even though a portion of the persons 
coincidentally have qualifications, this may constitute a criminal breach 
under Article 125 of the Banking Act, i.e., the offense of illegal fund 
solicitation.153  
b. Illegal Fund Raising 
Taiwan’s SEA provides that, except for government bonds or other 
 
 148. See Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 226-27. 
 149. See Part II.A.4. 
 150. BOAO REVIEW & LUFAX.COM, supra note 109, at 14.  
 151. GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 166. The FSC warned in 2016 that the intermediation services 
provided by P2P lending platforms should not involve taking funds from the general public indirectly or 
directly such that their undertakings have anything to do with “accepting deposits” under the Banking 
Act and “accepting deposits of funds as stored value funds” under the EPI Act. See Press Release, Fin. 
Supervisory Commission, Jin Guan Hui Dui Yu Guo Nei Wang Lu Jie Dai Ping Tai Fa Zhan Xian 
Kuang Zhi Shuo Ming [FSC on the Current Development of Online Lending Platforms in Taiwan] (Apr. 
14, 2016), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01604140004&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News 
(hereinafter “Online Lending Platforms”); WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 213-14. 
 152. See Part III.A.2. 
 153. See Zuigao Fayuan (最高法院) [Supreme Court], Xingshi (刑事) [Criminal Division], 104 
Tai Shang Zi No. 417 (104台上字第 417號刑事判決) (2015) (Taiwan); GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 
166. 
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securities exempted by the Competent Authority, the public offering or 
issuing of securities shall be prohibited without an effective registration 
with the Competent Authority.154 In applying for approval to publicly 
offer and issue securities, the issuer is required to submit a prospectus.155 
P2P platforms that convert a loan into an investment vehicle without 
permission from the Competent Authority may violate the 
aforementioned requirements under Taiwan’s SEA.156  
The SEC has declared that notes backed by loans that are selected and 
funded by investors on P2P platforms are deemed investment contracts 
and shall, thus, be regulated under the Securities Act.157 Nonetheless, 
Taiwan’s SEA enumerates all the regulated securities, albeit such 
securities do not include the promissory note issued by P2P platforms. 
The Ministry of Finance in Taiwan (the predecessor of the FSC) used to 
classify the following as SEA-governed securities—foreign investment-
oriented securities and investment contracts into which overseas Chinese 
or foreigners enter to raise funds from local investors in Taiwan for 
outward investment in foreign jurisdictions; these regulatory practices 
do not clarify whether investment contracts are securities governed 
under the SEA.158 If Taiwan’s P2P platforms under the debt assignment 
model divide a loan into several sub-units and then issue similar notes to 
investors after they purchase any sub-unit of the loan, this business 
model will look like the U.S. P2P lending model of asset securitization 
before the SEC issued the Order in 2008, requiring Prosper to sell notes 
through a prospectus with an effective registration statement.159 In this 
regard, the FSC issued a press release in 2016, warning that matching 
business conducted on P2P platforms cannot involve “publicly issuing 
securities” under SEA and “publicly issuing Beneficial Securities or 
Asset-Backed Securities” under the FASA. Thus, if the notes issued 
under the debt assignment model or even under the asset securitization 
model, just as in the form of payment dependent notes issued by 
Lending Club and Prosper in the United States, P2P lending companies 
in Taiwan may be criminally liable under Articles 22 and 174 of the 
 
 154. Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (證券交易法) [Securities and Exchange Act] §22 para. 1 (promulgated 
and effective Apr. 30, 1968, as amended Jan. 11, 2006). 
 155. Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (證券交易法) [Securities and Exchange Act] §30 para. 1 (promulgated 
and effective Apr. 30, 1968, as amended June 12, 2002). 
 156. Jiang, supra note 143, at 153-54. 
 157. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 158. See ZHONGHUA MINGUO CAIZHENG BU (中華民國財政部) [MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF 
R.O.C.], Sept. 12, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 00900 Hao Gonggao (76年 9月 12日臺財證（二）
字第 900號公告) (1987); Sept. 18, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 6805 Hao Han (76年 9月 18日臺財
證（二）字第 6805號函) (1987); Oct. 30, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 6934 Hao Gonggao (76年 10
月 30日臺財證（二）字第 6934號公告) (1987); Jiang, supra note 143, at 153. 
 159. See supra Parts I.A & B.1. 
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SEA or Articles 73 and 108 of the FASA.160 
C. Summary 
As discussed above, some business models of P2P lending in Taiwan 
may violate the Banking Act, EPI Act, FASA, or SEA. However, 
whether requiring P2P platforms to register with the FSC in their 
infancy (hence bearing strict information disclosure obligations under 
the SEA or FASA), or requiring those platforms to apply for a 
bank/Electronic Payment Institution license under the Banking/EPI Act 
may significantly increase the cost to newly-established P2P platforms, 
hindering the concomitant financial innovation and inclusion. We may 
learn a lesson from the U.S. regulatory response to P2P lending. After 
the SEC tightened regulations of the P2P lending industry, P2P 
platforms such as Lending Club and Prosper raised the required 
threshold of borrowers’ credit scores substantially; that way, P2P 
lending would essentially be unable to meet the loan demands of 
individuals or SMEs who have difficulties obtaining funds from the 
traditional financial institutions.161  
Even if Taiwanese P2P lending platforms are required to act merely 
as an information intermediary, it can use information technology to 
review borrowers’ credit and set loan interest rates in a more efficient 
way than traditional financial intermediaries do. 162  Lenders can 
subsequently rely on the credit scores provided and interest rates set by 
the platforms to select their lending projects. If this emerging credit 
assessment mechanism fails to enter the market, it would harm lenders’ 
interests and those of economically marginal borrowers, compromising 
digital financial inclusion. Therefore, government responses to business 
models of P2P lending in particular, and to FinTech in general, would be 
the key.163 From a broader perspective, during the early development of 
such innovative FinTech-enabled financial services as P2P lending, in 
order to prevent the FinTech industry from excessive exposure to legal 
risks due to regulatory uncertainty of business models, it is necessary to 
establish a flexible and proportionate regulatory regime where regulators 
and the regulated can collaborate, carry on a dialogue, and experiment 
 
 160. See Online Lending Platforms, supra note 151; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 213. 
 161. See supra Part I.C. 
 162. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 4, at 7 (indicating that “[a] credit score based on the digital 
footprint should therefore serve as a benchmark for other models that use more elaborate sources of 
information that might either be more costly to collect or only accessible to a selected group of 
intermediaries”). 
 163. For comparing regulatory responses to P2P lending among the United States, China, and 
Taiwan, see infra Part IV.A. 
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with what would be more appropriate regulatory approaches. 164  In 
addition to the regulatory sandbox discussed below, 165  we could 
consider moving consumer financial competition into a separate and 
single agency for a more structural change in the extant financial 
regulation; that way prudential regulation concerns would not dominate 
over consumer financial competition sparked by FinTech innovations 
such as P2P lending.166 This regulatory proposal is intended to focus the 
mission of consumer financial competition and innovation, including 
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement, in the hands of a single 
professional agency, who would be at the same hierarchical level as the 
FSC, while simultaneously independent of it. Accordingly, a stronger 
and independent body exclusive for consumer financial competition and 
innovation could be best placed to foster healthy market competition 
among traditional financial institutions and FinTech firms that provide 
digital financial inclusion. 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF FINTECH REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN TAIWAN: 
P2P LENDING AS AN EXAMPLE 
A. A Comparison of Regulatory Responses to P2P Lending 
As a commentator argues, to address the current issue that financial 
services remain expensive and inefficient, rather than a top-down 
structural change in regulation of incumbents that is subject to 
prohibitively high costs of political economy and coordination, 
“regulators should consider policies that promote low-leverage 
technologies and the entry of new firms.” 167  The current financial 
system might also be troubled by incumbents’ regulatory capture, 
creating entry barriers to new competitors. 168  When it comes to 
 
 164. For detailed discussion on the spirit of MPBR, see infra Part IV.B. 
 165. See infra Part IV.C. 
 166. See infra Part IV.D. 
 167. Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 1, 2–3, 9, 18 (NBER Working Paper No. 
22476, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22476. 
 168. See id. at 16 (“FinTech firms will enter where they think they can make a profit, but there are 
many regions of the financial system where incumbents are entrenched and entry is difficult.”). See also 
Abraham J.B. Cable, Institutionalized Disruption: The Rise of the Reformer Startup, 12 HASTINGS BUS. 
L. J. 1, 12 (2015) (“[R]eformer startups represent the public interest. The success of their products 
exposes current regulation as wrongheaded. Reformer startups and their grassroots advocates educate, or 
expose, regulators and lawmakers who would otherwise be hopelessly anachronistic or beholden to 
incumbents.”). To illustrate the regulatory capture problem in regulating the P2P lending industry, 
commentators contend that [i]t is the Chinese commercial banks that called for heavy regulation towards 
P2P lending”, that “[t]hese big players have tried to maintain their monopolistic position in financial 
markets”, and that [r]egulators and legislators are likely to be influenced by lob-bying efforts due to 
information asymmetry.” Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 56 (footnote omitted). 
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regulatory responses to Fintech startups, scholars examining the 
likelihood of promoting much structural change distinguish between two 
broad categories of change—“reactive” and “proactive”—as described 
below.169 
 
Reactive. The first group includes countries in which nothing is 
being done. There is No Regulatory Talk or Action. The second 
group consists of countries in which there is partial or Fragmented 
Regulation of Fin[T]ech. Certain institutions, such as the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the United 
States, may offer certain safe harbor provisions for certain type of 
Fin[T]ech companies. Yet there appears little willingness to 
genuinely embrace the technology and its regulatory implications, 
nor is there any comprehensive plan as to how Fin[T]ech can or 
should be regulated. 
 
Proactive. In such countries, there is a significant amount of 
regulatory attention paid to Fin[T]ech. Such attention can take the 
form of consultation papers, White Papers, or conferences. But 
action is limited and there is a risk that prioritizing Fin[T]ech can 
slide into an empty lip service aimed at projecting an image of 
regulatory action when, in reality, action is limited. . . . A second 
group of countries engage in what might be characterized as 
Regulatory Guidance. . . . A final group of countries have 
embraced the possibilities of Fin[T]ech by creating a so-called 
regulatory sandbox.170 
 
 
 169. Mark Fenwick et al., Fintech and the Financing of Entrepreneurs: From Crowdfunding to 
Marketplace Lending, in THE ECONOMICS OF CROWDFUNDING: STARTUPS, PORTALS AND INVESTOR 
BEHAVIOR 103, 108 (Douglas Cumming & Lars Hornuf eds., 2018). 
 170. Id. at 119. In terms of “reactive” regulatory responses, as FinTech is also a type of 
technology, “[t]he regulation of any disruptive new technology is always going to be reactive and based 
on an uncertain and politicized factual basis.” Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, 
Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 561, 574 (2017). Traditional regulation is characterized by a slow, deliberative, reactive, and 
sometimes even cumbersome process in response. See Alice Armitage, Andrew K. Cordova, & Rebecca 
Siegel, Design Thinking: The Answer to the Impasse Between Innovation and Regulation, 2 GEO. L. 
TECH. REV. 3, 13, 14, 25, 65 (2017). On the contrary, when it comes to “proactive” regulatory responses, 
some commentators normatively argue that “[l]awmaking and regulatory design needs to become more 
proactive, dynamic[,] and responsive . . . to promote innovation . . . of a disruptive new technology . . .” 
Fenwick et al., supra note 170, at 561, 584-85. Resonating with the aforementioned perspective, others 
maintain in the context of FinTech that “[r]egulatory sandboxes . . . provide an example of a shift away 
from traditional regulatory approaches and represent an attempt to embrace principles of proactive, 
dynamic[,] and responsive regulation.” Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin & Ian Ramsay, Fintech 
Sandboxes: Achieving a Balance between Regulation and Innovation 1 (2017), 
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3090844 (emphasis added). See also id. at 13, 15-19 (promoting a more 
proactive regulatory response to disruptive technological innovation such as FinTech). 
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As an example of the U.S. government’s response to FinTech, the 
SEC regulated P2P lending platforms in line with the extant securities 
laws, requiring P2P platforms to sell the notes by prospectus, and file 
annual and quarterly reports. In this regard, the SEC’s response to 
FinTech firms, such as P2P platforms, was reactive.171 Even though the 
GAO, U.S. Treasury, and OCC have considered how to supervise the 
growing FinTech industry, their initiatives reflect fragmented regulation 
of FinTech.172  Moreover, the OCC’s proposal of chartering FinTech 
firms and regulating them as banks appears to be reactive as well 
because it supports the extant entry barriers and banks’ own style of 
regulation, which may cost FinTech startups too much time and 
money.173 
As for the Chinese regulatory response to such FinTech, i.e., P2P 
lending, the Chinese government initially adopted a hands-off approach, 
but shifted toward a more reactive approach after a number of P2P 
failures.174  The Chinese regulators brought in a list of 12 forbidden 
activities under the Interim Measures. As discussed earlier, both the 
Guiding Opinions of 2015 and the Interim Measures of 2016 stress that 
P2P platforms can only adopt the information intermediation model.175  
When it comes to the Taiwanese government response to FinTech, 
even though P2P lending in Taiwan developed quite a bit later than in 
the U.S. and China,176 the government initially seems to be reactive in 
releasing informal guidance, warning the P2P lending industry against 
crossing four major red lines, while highly encouraging the industry to 
collaborate with banks.177 Nonetheless, Taiwan took a more proactive 
approach to FinTech in January 2018, creating a formal regulatory 
sandbox regime by enacting the Financial Technology Development and 
Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech Sandbox Act”), which 
was promulgated by the President on January 31, 2018.178 In theory, 
 
 171. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 172. See supra Parts I.B.1, 2, & 3. 
 173. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 118. 
 174. Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 16-20. 
 175. See supra Parts II.B & C. Commentators argue that China’s existing system regulating P2P 
lending “will exhaustively dictate how P2P lending platforms conduct their business”, and that this 
rules-based anti-experimentalism approach lacks responsiveness and flexibility brought by principles-
based experimental approach, probably hampering benefits from the P2P lending industry and stifling 
innovation in the sharing economy as a whole. Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 55. For elaborating on the 
distinction between a principles-based regulatory regime and a rules-based regime, see infra Part IV.B. 
 176. See supra Part III.A. 
 177. See supra Parts III.B.1 & 3. 
178. Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Shi Yan Tiao Li (金融科技發展與創新實驗條例) 
[Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act] (promulgated and effective 
Jan. 31, 2018), 
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under this approach, “[r]egulators create a regulatory sandbox in which 
they facilitate and encourage a space to experiment,” allowing “the 
‘testing’ of new technology-driven services, under the supervision of 
regulators” and ensuring “that meaningful data can be gathered for the 
evaluation of risk in a safe environment”; the goal of such regulatory 
experimentation is that “[s]uch data can then facilitate evidence-based 
regulatory reform.”179  
This article argues that Taiwan’s legislation of the regulatory sandbox 
cannot be proactive only in form. In substance, as a short-term goal in 
the reform agenda, a more principles-based strategy of financial 
regulation (or “MPBR”) is a key point, as is the regulatory attitude.180 
Such institutional philosophy should be embedded in the sandbox 
regime to make it “collaborative and dialogical, in the sense that 
regulators, incumbents and new service providers are engaged in an on-
going dialogue about the most effective means to gather relevant 
information and to identify the most appropriate regulatory model.”181 
As a long-term goal toward a structural change in the extant regulation 
of incumbents, we would propose reallocating competition authority to a 
motivated financial agency. This professional agency would be separate 
from and independent of the FSC—the sole financial market watchdog 
in Taiwan, charged with both consumer protection and prudential 
regulation. The newly created single financial agency would be better 
positioned to safeguard competition and innovation enabled by 
FinTech.182 
B. More Principle-based Financial Regulation (“MPBR”) as 
Institutional Philosophy 
In designing the regulatory regime for such innovative FinTech-
enabled financial services as P2P lending, regulators should rethink their 
regulatory basis or institutional philosophy especially in the context of 
global regulatory competition for attracting FinTech firms and 
markets.183 In other words, from the perspective of both the FinTech-
based industry and financial regulators, a change in regulatory attitude 
 
https://law.fsc.gov.tw/law/EngLawContent.aspx?lan=E&id=2104&KW=Financial+Technology+Develo
pment+and+Innovative+Experimentation+Act (hereinafter the “FinTech Sandbox Act”). 
 179. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119. 
 180. See infra Part IV.B. 
 181. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119; Chang-Hsien Tsai & Kuan-Jung Peng, The 
FinTech Revolution and Financial Regulation: The Case of Online Supply-Chain Financing, 4(1) ASIAN 
J. L. & SOC’Y 109, 109, 116 (2017). For more explanation on the connection between MPBR and the 
regulatory sandbox, see infra Part IV.B. 
 182. See infra Part IV.D. 
 183. Fenwick et al., supra note 170, at 584. 
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would be needed to address the issue of how FinTech-based products 
and services should be regulated.184 What follows is an introduction of 
two distinct types of regulatory regimes: a principles-based regulatory 
regime and a rules-based regime. A principles-based regime imposes 
more flexible compliance obligations. 185  Since the majority of the 
potential participants in FinTech industries are start-ups, the principles-
based approach may provide start-ups with the benefit of flexibility in 
their infancy; nonetheless, the higher cost of legal compliance associated 
with a rules-based approach would be balanced by being more attractive 
to investors given that regulatory clarity and legal predictability could be 
important for start-ups and investors. 186  Nevertheless, a strategy of 
MPBR would help more rapidly respond to the challenges arising from 
the complexity and innovative nature of modern financial markets.187 
The MPBR represents a shift in institutional philosophy from a 
historically predominant rules-based regulatory regime to a less 
prescriptive approach.188 
When it comes to general regulatory responses to FinTech,  
 
[i]n between the traditional choices of doing nothing and 
developing completely new regulatory frameworks, regulators can 
carve out pockets of activities (i.e.[,] defined by product, scope[,] 
or scale) where participants can benefit on a case-by-case basis 
from regulatory forbearance (such as “no-action” letters in the 
United States) or from restricted licenses or special charters (such 
as the [U.S.] OCC’s for banks).189  
 
No matter the form through which the government responds to 
FinTech, regulatory forbearance, restricted licenses, and special charters 
 
 184. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis, & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New 
Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1311 (2016). 
 185. Id. at 1311-12. 
 186. Id. at 1312. 
 187. Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 273 (2011). Even if a principles-based regulatory regime may not 
provide the clarity and certainty provided by the rules-based regulatory regimes, a principles-based 
regulatory regime could be more dynamic and effective in keeping regulatory pace with the times. 
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 303 
(2012). See also Allen, supra note 41, at 12 (“As for regulators, the hope is that principles-based 
regulation will remain relevant as industry practices change, and thus make regulatory arbitrage more 
difficult—it is harder to arbitrage the spirit of a principle than the letter of a narrower rule.”). 
 188. Awrey, supra note 187, at 282-83 (“MPBR reflects a tacit acknowledgement that the 
effectiveness of a regulatory regime in delivering desired regulatory outcomes is a product not just of 
statutory design, but also institutional philosophy.”) (emphasis in original). 
 189. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 58-59 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original). See also 
id. at 59 (“The practical effect of forbearance through no-action letters, restricted licensing, or special 
charters is that of partial exemptions or dispensation within a broader regulatory framework.”). 
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exemplify the spirits of FinTech regulation, which would embrace 
regulatory humility, namely risk-based proportionate MPBR.190 To be 
sure, some may be concerned that informal case-by-case regulatory 
guidance would be a temporary tool and that, if lasting too long, could 
bring about another kind of legal uncertainty. Therefore, regulators of 
FinTech firms across an increasing number of jurisdictions including 
Taiwan have shifted to a more formal and structured regulatory 
experimentation, i.e., regulatory sandboxes, as discussed below. 
C. An MPBR-embedded Regulatory Sandbox? 
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) adopted the regulatory 
sandbox, permitting “financial innovation to be carried out in 
experimental ways within the parameters of regulatory approval and 
monitoring.” 191  This regulatory sandbox is a “‘safe place’ in which 
businesses can test innovative products, services, business models[,] and 
delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal 
regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question.”192 On 
the one hand, the regulatory sandbox would signify that the FCA 
introduced a formal form of proportionate governance without excessive 
regulation, which is aligned with the spirit of MPBR.193 On the other 
hand, the UK leading the adoption of the regulatory sandbox indicates a 
horizontal experimentation across different jurisdictions that they are 
engaging in regulatory competition “naturally” by adjusting their 
financial regulation with a view to facilitating the establishment and 
operation of domestic and foreign FinTech firms. 194  If a jurisdiction 
intends to lead the global regulatory competition for attracting FinTech 
firms, MPBR-embedded strategies of policy/regulatory experimentation 
 
 190. Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 125. At least in the early stage of emerging FinTech 
businesses,  
 
when dealing with a new innovative technology, regulators could start by issuing 
informal guidance under the umbrella of a pre-existing principles-based framework. By 
allowing startups to take a flexible approach to regulatory compliance, rather than 
investing limited startup funds on researching legal rules and how to comply with them, a 
principles-based approach could encourage innovation by such firms. 
 
Allen, supra note 41, at 15. 
 191. Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, 
Intermediation and Markets- Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55, 
64 (2016).  
 192. Regulatory Sandbox, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY 2 (2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf (last visited July 20, 2018). 
 193. See Chiu, supra note 191, at 64.  
 194. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis, & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the 
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 376, 408-9 (2017). 
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should be pursued with a shift in intuitional philosophy toward light-
touch or humble regulation.195 As a necessary complement and more 
structured change in FinTech regulation, such market-based regulatory 
mechanisms as the regulatory sandbox would be supportive to FinTech 
development, if regulators grasped the spirit of MPBR that is supposed 
to be reflected in the regulatory sandbox, that is, a style of “collaborative 
regulation that facilitates . . . policy experimentation.”196 
Following the trend of creating the regulatory sandbox as a more 
proactive and experimental model, the FSC has also incorporated 
versions of the FinTech regulatory sandbox proposed by several cross-
party Taiwanese legislators. In December 2017, a synthesized version of 
the FinTech Sandbox Act was introduced and, in early 2018, was 
formally passed by the legislature and promulgated by the President. 
The FinTech Sandbox Act intends to provide a way for FinTech startups 
to safely test newly developed FinTech-enabled financial services or 
products197 by temporarily exempting them—at least to an extent—from 
complex financial regulations. 198  Due to the fact that Taiwan has a 
tradition of heavily regulating the financial industry with a rules-based 
institutional regime, the FinTech Sandbox Act is important as it is 
necessary to enact a statute to thoroughly overcome financial regulatory 
barriers to allow both regulators and the regulated to carry out these 
policy experiments.199 Without the Act, even if FSC officials wanted to 
adopt any regulatory forbearance approach similar to U.S. no-action 
letters, restricted licensing, or special charters, judges would probably 
hold these forbearance approaches in violation of mandatory law; the 
downsides of the forbearance-based case-by-case experimental model 
for regulators would be that “the regulators’ conduct may be found to be 
negligent if not backed up by the legislature” and that “[t]his prospect of 
potential liability may lead to sub-optimal levels of dispensation 
practice.”200 
 
 195. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 116, 118. To illustrate whether regulatory choices such 
as the regulatory sandbox as a form of regulatory experimentation would affect levels of investment 
across jurisdictions, scholars empirically study the government responses to FinTech in 17 jurisdictions. 
They find that “in those countries with a more proactive response—particularly involving Regulatory 
Guidance or Regulatory Experimentation—there is evidence that this proactive approach makes the 
jurisdiction more attractive as a potential location for starting Fin[T]ech operations.” Fenwick et al., 
supra note 169, at 120. 
 196. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 126-27; Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 124. 
 197. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 1. 
 198. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, arts. 25-26. 
 199. Jhih-Cheng Wang (王志誠), Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Shi Yan Tiao Li Zhi Li 
Fa Ji Ping Shi (金融科技發展與創新實驗條例之立法及評譯)[ Commentary on Financial Technology 
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act], 31(1) CUN KUAN BAO XIAN ZI XUN JI KAN (存款保
險資訊季刊) [CDIC QUARTERLY BULLETIN] 1, 18 (2018).  
 200. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 62-63. 
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In particular, according to experimental results within the sandbox, a 
competent authority must review whether existing laws and regulations 
should be amended, or whether there is a need to issue regulatory 
guidance.201 In addition, on a regular basis, the competent authority is 
required to improve itself by reviewing and amending relevant laws and 
regulations, while rendering necessary assistance to FinTech 
businesses. 202  Theoretically, Taiwan’s legislature would, via these 
provisions, embed the institutional philosophy of MPBR in the mindset 
of the FSC by creating a collaborative governance environment 
premised on real trust and shared understanding. In this environment, 
regulators, traditional service providers, and FinTech innovators can 
carry on an ongoing, sophisticated, and iterative regulatory dialogue 
regarding effective experiments to gather relevant information and to 
identify an appropriate regulatory model, while working together “to 
ensure that appropriate consumer protection safeguards are built into 
 
 201. Art. 17 of the FinTech Sandbox Act stipulates: 
 
(1) Where an innovative experimentation is inventive, effectively increasing the 
efficiency of financial services, reducing operational and use costs, or enhancing the 
interests of financial consumers and enterprises, the competent authority should 
take the following actions in consideration of the implementation status of the 
innovative experimentation: 
1. Reviewing and revising relevant financial regulations. 
2. Providing assistance to the applicant in starting a business or entering into 
strategic cooperation [with relevant organization]. 
3. Making referrals to relevant government agencies (institutions) or 
organizations or funds that offer business startup assistance. 
(2) If it is decided by the competent authority that relevant financial laws should be 
amended, the competent authority should, no later than three (3) months after the 
end of the innovative experimentation, complete an amendment draft of the 
financial laws and submit the draft to the Executive Yuan for review. 
 
The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, arts. 17. 
 202. Paragraphs 2 and 3, Art. 18 of the FinTech Sandbox Act provide: 
  
(1) The competent authority should establish and periodically review financial 
technology development policy, actively provide financial technology enterprises 
with necessary assistance, guidance and counseling services, and regularly invite 
representatives of the financial technology industry and representatives of related 
government agencies to discuss and coordinate financial technology development 
related matters. The guidance and assistance mechanism for financial technology 
development will be prescribed by the competent authority. 
(2) The competent authority shall, within three (3) months after the end of each year, 
submit a written report to the Legislative Yuan on the promotion of financial 
technology development, the results of innovative experimentation and regulatory 
amendments made therefor for the year, and disclose the content of the report on its 
website. 
 
The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 18, ¶ 2 - 3. 
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new products and services.”203 Notably, the shift toward MPBR via the 
legislative sandbox would not necessarily be a deregulatory move 
because closer supervision/engagement between FinTech enterprises 
and financial authorities could effectively substitute for the clearer limits 
to business models currently imposed by hard rules; such strict 
regulatory scrutiny into FinTech startups is advocated by legacy 
financial institutions. Some might wonder: in practice, could the 
Taiwanese regulatory sandbox effectively prevent such FinTech 
industry, like P2P lending, from excessive exposure to legal risks due to 
regulatory uncertainty of business models, since Articles 17 and 18 of 
the FinTech Sandbox Act appear to have established a regulatory regime 
where regulators and the regulated can collaborate, carry on a dialogue, 
and experiment with what would be more appropriate regulatory 
approaches?  
D. The Political Economy of Regulating P2P Lending and Its 
Implications for FinTech Regulation in Taiwan  
The enactment of Articles 17 and 18 of the FinTech Sandbox Act 
might merely be a temporary tool to spur a shift in the institutional 
philosophy of Taiwanese financial regulators in the short term. At least 
in the long run, Taiwan could consider reforming the structure of its 
financial regulatory system by adopting a stronger authority to safeguard 
financial competition and innovation where prudential regulation 
concerns do not always predominate over consumer FinTech 
competition and innovation. A professional consumer financial 
competition body that is separate from and independent of the FSC, 
possessing exclusive control over its own rulemaking, supervision, and 
enforcement of consumer financial competition measures in Taiwan, 
would benefit FinTech development contributing to digital financial 
inclusion. 
Specifically, the FinTech Sandbox Act tasked the FSC with 
publishing regulations and rules for the Act to be implemented. 204 
Accordingly, the FSC issued a press release in April 2018 and 
announced the FinTech Sandbox Act would be officially implemented 
on April 30, 2018,205 while adding an appendix titled “Instructions and 
 
 203. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 117, 126; Awrey, supra note 187, at 285-86; Zetzsche et 
al., supra note 5, at 61-62, 79; Regulatory Sandbox Lessons Learned Report, FINANCIAL CONDUCT 
AUTHORITY 3 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-
lessons-learned-report.pdf (hereinafter “Regulatory Sandbox Report”). 
 204. See, e.g., The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 18, ¶ 1. 
 205. See Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin 
Shi Yan Tiao Li Ji San Xiang Shou Quan Fa Qui Jiang Yu Yi Ling Qi Nian Si Yue San Shi Ri Shi Xing 
[Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act Is about to Be Implemented 
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FAQ of Financial Technology Innovative Experimentation Laws and 
Regulations” (“Sandbox FAQ”).206 The Sandbox FAQ states that under 
the FinTech Sandbox Act, the term “innovative experimentation” means 
utilizing technological innovation or business model innovation to 
undertake experimentation of financial business that requires the 
permission, approval, or concession of the competent authority, and that 
if any innovative experiment is not made on the aforementioned 
financial business (e.g., P2P lending platforms), there is no need for 
application to the FSC. 207  Why did the FSC give this unwelcome 
informal guidance for the P2P lending? This unfriendly guidance could 
allegedly be traced back to 2016, when the FSC had initially taken a 
reactive approach by issuing a press release in April 2016 and releasing 
its FinTech White Paper in May 2016, suggesting that P2P lending 
platforms would (or should) merely act as an information intermediary. 
In practice, we cannot but doubt that “the strength of industry groups 
and labor” may have “want[ed] to curb incentives to FinTech firms and 
support existing subsidies and barriers to entry.”208 This is especially 
apparent based on the FSC officials’ 2016 decision to highly encourage 
banks and P2P platforms to collaborate with each other as it was the 
FSC’s aim to pressure FinTech-based P2P platforms to comply with 
existing law and regulations applied to banks—thus, “supporting the 
 
on Apr. 30, 2018] (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01804260001&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News 
[hereinafter “Sandbox Press Release”]. 
 206. Jin Rong Ke Ji Chuang Xin Shi Yan Fa Gui Wen Da Ji [Instructions and FAQ of Financial 
Technology Innovative Experimentation Laws and Regulations], FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (Apr. 
26, 2018), https://www.mjib.gov.tw/userfiles/files/35-
%E6%B4%97%E9%8C%A2%E9%98%B2%E5%88%B6%E8%99%95/files/%E5%AF%A6%E5%8B
%99%E5%95%8F%E7%AD%94/02-06-13.pdf (last visited July 21, 2018) (hereinafter Sandbox FAQ). 
 207. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
 208. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 118; Amos Chen, P2P Ye Zhe Yu Yin Hang Zhu Guan 
Ji Guan De San Jiao Xi Ti San Fang Wu Fa Hao Hao He Zuo Dou Shi Ka Zai Xin Ren Wen Ti [The 
Triangular Relations among P2P Companies, Banks and the Competent Authority: Lack of Trust 
Contributes to Collaborative Failure among the Three Parties], TECHORANGE (July 26, 2016), 
https://buzzorange.com/techorange/2016/07/26/p2p-taiwan/. As discussed below, the FSC’s aggressive 
calls for P2P platforms’ partnering with rather than competing against banks constitute a type of entry 
barriers to digital innovation. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of 
Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 234 (2018). Moreover, “banks are publicly subsidized and insulated 
from competition.” Id. 
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extant financial system and their own style of regulation.” 209  Along 
these lines, the Taiwanese government appears to have shifted to a more 
proactive response to FinTech by legislating the FinTech Sandbox Act 
to permit cautious regulatory experimentation. This shift, however, is 
arguably just in form—the FSC, in substance, may be more committed 
to the existing style of regulation, lacking incentives to abandon the 
current approach in favor of the newly mandated alternative approach. 
This may be because the FSC could be subject to regulatory capture, 
regulatory inertia, and the tendency of government agencies to be averse 
to risk.210 Ergo, even a more structured change in the current financial 
regulation such as the FinTech Sandbox Act might also be troubled by 
the FSC’s conservative implementation;211 we might therefore expect 
the effectiveness of the Taiwanese legislative sandbox to be limited as 
commentators similarly argue that “there is a risk that prioritizing 
 
 209. See supra Part III.B.1; GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 159-60, 173. See also Editorial, Jin 
Guan Hui Jian Guan Si Wei De Yan Hua [The Evolving Regulatory Philosophy of the Financial 
Supervisory Commission], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan) (May 2, 2018), 
at A2 (noting that the FSC’s policy on P2P lending platforms is to encourage banks to invest in those 
platforms to acquire control or even 100% shareholding and thus to have those platforms comply with 
existing law and regulations applied to banks). We have discussed that the OCC has considered 
possibilities of offering special-purpose FinTech charters in Part I.B.4. Similar to FSC’s calls for 
partnering with banks, “[t]he OCC emphasized that the new license would not ‘weaken the competitive 
position of existing banks,’ but, if anything, would ‘level the playing field’ by ensuring regulations 
currently applied to national banks also applied to [F]in[T]ech.” Van Loo, supra note 208, at 260. 
 210. See supra Part IV.A; MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS 
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358 (2009) (noting that “Economists have predicted that the incentive 
structure faced by bureaucrats will lead to unduly risk-averse decision-making, producing an 
inefficiently high level of regulation.”) (emphasis added). Government agencies such as the FSC tend to 
be averse to risk, “defensive, threat-avoiding, scandal-minimizing,” and “reluctant to take on activities 
that embrace seemingly intractable problems and that are fraught with the danger of unintended 
consequences including regulatory failure and criticism.” STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 192, at 348 
(footnotes omitted). This might also be due to regulatory inertia, i.e., “the tendency of regulators to 
adhere to their original proposed rules and to resist change, even when that change may make rules more 
effective.” Asaf Eckstein, Regulatory Inertia and Interest Groups: How the Structure of the Rulemaking 
Process Affects the Substance of Regulations 1, 7-11, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285593 (last visited 
July 21, 2018). See also Bromberg et al., supra note 170, at 13, 15 (arguing that regulators should avoid 
regulatory inertia, and be more proactive and adaptive in regulating new technologies and business 
models as in the FinTech industry). For other applications of regulatory/institutional inertia, see, e.g., 
Melissa J. Luttrell, The Social Cost of Inertia: How Cost-Benefit Incoherence Threatens to Derail U.S. 
Climate Action, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, On Not Revisiting 
Official Discount Rates: Institutional Inertia and the Social Cost of Carbon (Oct. 21, 
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343379. 
 211. See Editorial, Ping Yi Wang Lu Yin Hang Zhi Zhao De Bao Shou Zheng Ce [Commentary on 
the Conservative Policy for Online Bank Licensure], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] 
(Taiwan), (July 3, 2018), at A2 (hereinafter Conservative Policy) (noting that even though the 
legislature enacted the FinTech Sandbox Act with the strong ambition to encourage financial innovation, 
the FSC is so conservative in implementation that many startups with blockchain technologies and 
financial innovations decide not to apply for entrance into the sandbox and even relocate their whole 
teams overseas after finding from the officials that staying within the sandbox would expose their 
technology and business development to more uncertainty).  
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Fin[T]ech can slide into . . . empty lip service aimed at projecting an 
image of regulatory action when, in reality, action is limited.”212 
What implications can be drawn from the regulation of P2P lending 
for FinTech regulation at large in Taiwan? From an institutional design 
perspective, we would propose reallocating competition authority to a 
motivated financial agency to provide long-term regulatory certainty for 
FinTech-driven financial market development by stimulating financial 
competition and innovation. Firstly, some would propose finding an 
existing agency to be reallocated the authority of FinTech 
supervision.213 To be sure, the FinTech Sandbox Act stipulates that the 
term “competent authority” as used in this Act shall mean the FSC, and 
that “[t]o develop innovative financial technologies, assist in innovative 
experimentation applications, and review and evaluate the feasibility 
and effectiveness of innovative experimentation in a professional 
manner, the competent authority should have a dedicated unit in place to 
handle related matters.” 214  Accordingly, the FSC establishes the 
Financial Technology Development and Innovative Center (the 
“FinTech Sandbox Center”).215  However, the Sandbox Center is still 
placed under the FSC and easily subject to the drawbacks of regulatory 
capture and inertia. In addition, mission conflict would haunt the 
 
 212. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119. Being seen doing something had tangible benefits for 
both legislators and the FSC as executive-branch rule-makers and enforcers. This political action is well 
described by Aviram’s bias arbitrage theory. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 789 (2007); Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating 
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2006). For an application of the bias arbitrage theory to 
financial regulation, see Tsai, supra note 11, at 239-43. We may observe a similar phenomenon in the 
case of equity crowdfunding regulations in Taiwan, where a gap may exist “between rhetoric (public-
spirited justifications) and reality (rent-seeking),” as the public choice explanation predicts. See Tsai, 
supra note 45, at 267-77. 
 213. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 292. 
 214. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 2. 
 215. Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Zhong Xin She Zhi 
Yao Dian Ji Zu Zhi Tu [Establishment Guidelines and Organizational Chart for the Financial 
Technology Development and Innovative Center] (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=479&parentpath=0,7,478&mcustomize=onemessages_view.jsp
&dataserno=201602230001&aplistdn=ou=data,ou=20160223020901,ou=one,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o
=fsc,c=tw&dtable=O20160223020901. See also Fin. Supervisory Commission, Important Measures: 
Preview of Draft Regulations Proposed in Accordance with the Authorization by the Financial 
Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=74&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&dat
aserno=201804110001&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=
Bulletin (indicating that “the FSC has expanded the role and function of the FinTech Office and changed 
its name to ‘Financial Technology Development and Innovation Center,’ which is responsible for tasks, 
such as developing Fin[T]ech and conducting innovative experiments. The Center also provides 
counseling and coaching service on Fin[T]ech business.”).  
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FinTech Sandbox Center under the FSC,216 since the FSC (charged with 
a predominant focus on prudential regulation), like U.S. prudential 
regulators, would focus more on the safety and soundness of banks than 
financial competition and innovation.217  
Therefore, at least in the long run, we propose a further structural 
change in the extant financial system and their own style of regulation, 
that is, creating a professional agency that is separate from the FSC (the 
sole financial market watchdog in Taiwan); the newly created single 
financial agency can provide a truly independent perspective, so as to 
mitigate the mission conflict conundrum because of trying to pursue 
financial competition and innovation through a naturally conservative 
prudential regulator. On the one hand, this reallocation of the authority 
of financial competition and innovation to a newly created single 
financial agency would better position regulators to safeguard healthy 
market competition and navigate innovation enabled by FinTech 
contributing to digital financial inclusion. 218  On the other hand, the 
creation of such a new agency is also in line with the objective of 
creating FCA’s seminal regulatory sandbox—“promoting effective 
competition in the interests of consumers”. 219  Moreover, this more 
 
 216. See Van Loo, supra note 208, at 269 (“Interdisciplinary research has underscored that in 
designing regulators, ‘a key danger to avoid is giving a single agency conflicting responsibilities.’”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 217. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 222 (indicating that the FSC “under the current financial 
regulatory architecture is a unified regulator and tends to focus more on prudential regulation concerns . 
. . .”). For mission conflict, especially in the context of U.S. FinTech regulation, see Van Loo, supra 
note 208, at 236-37, 263, 270. See also id., at 257 (illustrating that “regulators focused on bank safety 
and soundness may view competition as a threat to their primary mandate. These two themes—
insufficient attention to competition and overemphasizing the survival of big banks—permeate the 
institutional design flaws that undercut financial innovation.”). 
 218. As mentioned in Part IV.C, during the legislative process of the FinTech Sandbox Act, 
startups and Wan-Ju Yu, a leading legislator from the ruling party (who is one of the main advocates for 
startups), used to call for the competent authority of the FinTech Sandbox should be elevated to as high-
level as the Cabinet so as to have a more independent perspective from the FSC’s; however, due to 
considerations to have the bill passed as soon as possible, the version with the FSC as the competent 
authority was ultimately passed. Syueh-Huei Lu (呂雪彗), Jian Li Sha He Jin Rong Yeh Shuai Sian Shih 
Yan (監理沙盒 金融業率先實驗) [The Financial Sector Would Be Forerunners in Experimenting with 
the Regulatory Sandbox], JHONG SHIH DIAN ZIH BAO (中時電子報) [CHINA TIMES], (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20170220000027-260202. Therefore, our regulatory proposal 
is intended to focus the mission of consumer financial competition and innovation, including 
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement, in the hands of a single professional agency, who would be 
at least at the same hierarchical level as the FSC, while simultaneously independent of it. Of course, 
fleshing out the detailed regulatory design of the new agency charged with the authority of financial 
competition and innovation would remain a difficult issue requiring more research. In my further 
research, I would give detail of the alternative structure that I envision, including how much and what 
form of regulatory authority this agency would have, how “independent” such an agency would need to 
be (e.g., to what degree it would be susceptible to oversight, and therefore external influences), and just 
as significant, who would coordinate the inevitable overlap with the prudential regulator (and how). 
 219. Regulatory Sandbox Report, supra note 203, at 3. 
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proactive response would help prevent local Taiwanese FinTech startups 
from voting with feet;220 this more proactive approach would meanwhile 
help Taiwan’s government keep regulatory pace with other jurisdictions 
in the global regulatory competition for innovative FinTech startups.221  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The U.S. reactively regulated P2P lending start-ups under its extant 
securities regulations, setting forth regulation that may be intentionally 
strict so as to contain industrial development. In contrast, after a slew of 
major P2P scandals, including outright criminal violations, the Chinese 
government abandoned the initial hands-off regulatory approach and 
became reactive as well, by requiring business models of Chinese P2P 
lending to be limited to the information intermediation. Therefore, in 
China, other models, such as the asset securitization model or debt 
assignment model, can no longer be adopted.  
When it comes to government responses to P2P lending in Taiwan, 
the FSC had been reactive by highly encouraging collaboration between 
P2P platforms and banks, actually implying that the platforms need to 
comply with laws and regulations applied to banks. The Taiwanese 
government became more proactive when it enacted the statute to 
implement the regulatory sandbox, the FinTech Sandbox Act, in January 
2018. However, such a proactive shift in response to FinTech may have 
been proactive in form alone, as the legislative sandbox may not be an 
effective means to address regulatory dilemmas between prudential 
regulation and financial competition and innovation. Whereas the 
legislature attempted to embed the institutional philosophy in the FSC 
via the FinTech Sandbox Act, the FSC would in practice remain reactive 
in response to FinTech, such as P2P lending, by continuing to engage in 
conservative implementation, while maintaining a predominantly 
prudential focus due to being susceptible to regulatory capture and 
inertia. This pattern of activity prioritizes financial stability over 
financial competition and innovation. Therefore, at least in the long run, 
a structural change in institutional design of the financial system may be 
necessary to spur a transformation of the regulatory attitude of financial 
regulators towards an MPBR strategy of collaborative dialogical 
governance. 
In order to refrain from forcing FinTech startups to exit from Taiwan 
 
 220. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 120. 
 221. Conservative Policy, supra note 211 (highlighting that the FSC is quite conservative in 
implementing the FinTech Sandbox Act such that many startups with blockchain technologies and 
financial innovations decide not to apply for entrance into the sandbox and even relocate their whole 
teams overseas). 
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and relocate overseas due to long-term regulatory uncertainty, we could 
preliminarily consider a holistic reform agenda, i.e., adopting a fully 
independent consumer financial competition watchdog. With a newly 
created single professional agency playing the role of promoting 
financial competition and innovation for consumers independently from 
the FSC, the concerns of fostering healthy competition in offering 
digital financial services or products such as P2P lending to traditionally 
underserved consumers might be brought a real step closer from the 
periphery of Taiwan’s domestic financial system, to the power found at 
its apex. 
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